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City of Boerne v. Flores: Another Boost for Federalism
The United States Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 19931 ("RFRA" or the "Act") with the noble goal
of increasing protection for religious freedom.' The product of
compromise among groups as varied as the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Traditional Values Coalition,3 the bill enjoyed broad
political support.4 Congress passed RFRA almost unanimously,5 and
President Clinton signed it into law with lavish praise.6
RFRA was drafted in response to a very unpopular and widely
criticized7 Supreme Court decision, Employment Division v. Smith
(Smith 11)8. Critics of Smith II claimed that the Court abruptly
1. Pub. L. No. 193-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1994)).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (describing congressional findings supporting passage
of RFRA).
3. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretative Guide to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 ViLL. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1994).
4. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 40 (1995) ("Indeed, the
political support for RFRA was so widespread as to indicate a national consensus.").
5. RFRA was reported out of the House Committee on the Judiciary without
dissent, passed the full House by unanimous voice vote, passed the Senate by a vote of 97-
3, and was reapproved with conforming technical amendments by the House. See Berg,
supra note 3, at 17 n.64.
6. See President's Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 2 PuB. PAPERS 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993) [hereinafter President's Remarks]. The
Clinton administration was very supportive of the bill. See Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69
N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 438-39 (1994); Wendy S. Whitbeck, Restoring Rites and Rejecting
Wrongs: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 821,857 n.204
(1994).
7. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1108 (1994)
("[T]he general response [to Smith I1] among scholars has been one of dismay."); Ira C.
Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993
BYU L. REv. 259,260 ("Like many others, I believe that [Smith II] is substantively wrong
and institutionally irresponsible."); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise
Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REv. 117, 117 (noting there are "relatively few who believe that
the Court reached the right doctrinal result in Smith [I/]").
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Employment Division v. Smith first came to the Supreme
Court from the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1987. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 485
U.S. 660 (1988) (Smith 1). The Supreme Court of Oregon determined that the
Employment Division violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when it
denied unemployment benefits to two counselors who ingested peyote as part of a
religious ceremony. See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Or. 1986),
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changed its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause9 and
compromised religious liberty as a result." With RFRA, Congress
intended to restore the protection of religious freedom to the level
that existed prior to Smith 11.11 The particular language used by the
drafters and supporters of RFRA made it clear that RFRA was
promoted as overruling Smith 11,12 and many commentators expected
the Supreme Court to strike down RFRA as an unconstitutional
violation of the separation of powers. 3
In City of Boerne v. Flores,4 the Supreme Court did in fact strike
down RFRA, but not because it violated the separation of powers by
overruling a Supreme Court decision;Is rather, the Court held that
Congress had exceeded the scope of its authority when it enacted
RFRA. 6 The Court thus used Flores as an opportunity to revisit an
issue that had been in confusion since 1966: the scope of Congress's
authority under its Enforcement Clause powers. 7 Consequently, the
Court added Flores to its recent series of federalism cases, 8 again
vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). In doing so, the Oregon Court found it irrelevant that
peyote use was criminal. See id. at 450. Therefore, it did not decide whether peyote use
for sacramental purposes might be permitted under Oregon law, or protected under
Oregon's constitution. See Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 673. The Supreme Court found the
illegality of peyote use to be relevant and thus vacated the Oregon court's judgment and
remanded the case. See id. at 662. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court determined
that sacramental peyote use violated state law, but that its prohibition was invalid under
the Free Exercise Clause. See Smith I, 494 U.S. at 876. The case returned to the Court
in Smith II. See id.; infra notes 144-60 and accompanying text (discussing Smith I and
Smith II).
9. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (discussing the response to Smith
fl).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)-(b) (1994).
12. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text (describing the rhetoric
accompanying the passage of RFRA).
13. See infra notes 245-55 and accompanying text (summarizing the arguments that
RFRA violated the separation of powers).
14. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
15. Violation of the separation of powers was, however, the basis for the district
court's decision to strike RFRA. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text
(summarizing the district court opinion in Flores).
16. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
17. Congress is given the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which, by incorporation, include the Free Exercise Clause. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5; infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (explaining the incorporation).
"The nature and limits of Congress' enforcement power are among the deepest questions
of contemporary constitutional law...." Conkle, supra note 4, at 41.
18. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (striking a provision of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on federalism grounds); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking the Gun-Free School Zones Act because it exceeded
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shifting the power balance away from Congress toward the states.
This Note summarizes the provisions of RFRA and the
proffered basis for congressional authority to enact the statute.1 9 It
then presents the facts of the case, the various approaches to RFRA
taken by the lower courts, and a summary of the Supreme Court's
decision in Flores.2' Next, the Note describes the Court's Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, with particular attention given to the
Smith II decision21 and the reaction to Smith II that culminated in the
passage of RFRA.n After providing a brief discussion of the Court's
case law pertaining to Congress's Enforcement Clause powers,2 the
Note analyzes the Flores decision in terms of its impact upon
constitutional interpretation.2 4
Congress passed RFRAzs in direct response to the Smith II
decision.26 In Smith II, the Court held that generally applicable laws
apply equally to all, regardless of incidental burdens to religious
exercise.27  Congress took an opposing view. Congress's findings
stated that the Framers recognized the free exercise of religion as an
"inalienable right" and that even neutral laws might burden that
right.' Further, Congress found that governments should not
"substantially burden" that right without a compelling justification,
but Smith II had eliminated this requirement. 29  Finally, Congress
determined that "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and imposing federalism limits in the process). See
generally Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Cr.
REV. 125 (describing the cyclical nature of the judiciary's treatment of federalism).
19. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 39-114 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 115-60 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 176-238 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 239-370 and accompanying text.
25. RFRA is a short statute, consisting only of a declaration of congressional findings
and purposes, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), the basic provision of the law, see id.
§ 2000bb-1, some definitions, see id. § 2000bb-2, and some explanations, see id. § 2000bb-3
to -4.
26. The statute explicitly mentions both Smith II and Smith I1s precedents. See id.
§ 2000bb(a)-(b). The stated purpose of RFRA was to restore the Court's prior
compelling interest test, and thus to "provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." Id. § 2000bb(b).
27. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,882 (1990) (Smith 11).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1)-(2).
29. See id. § 2000bb(a)(3)-(4).
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interests. 30  RFRA provided that "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability."'31 It allowed an exception
to this rule, however, if the government could demonstrate both that
it had "a compelling governmental interest" and that the burden on
free exercise resulted from the "least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest. 3 2 The Act further provided
that "[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against
a government. 33
The purported source of Congress's power to pass RFRA was
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.34 Because the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment35 applies to the states by incorporation under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,36 Congress
has power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
through "appropriate legislation" the rights of individuals to the free
exercise of religion.37 In Flores, the Court addressed the issue of
whether RFRA was such appropriate legislation.
The dispute that gave rise to Flores began in Boerne, Texas.3 9 In
Boerne, Saint Peter Catholic Church could not accommodate its
30. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).
31. Id. § 2000bb-l(a). Note that "government" is defined broadly to include "a
branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under
color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State." Id. § 2000bb-2(1).
32 Id. § 2000bb-l(b). This test constitutes "strict scrutiny," the Supreme Court's
most demanding standard of review. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
34. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. The Enforcement Clause
supports congressional authority with respect to state law, but not with respect to RFRA's
action on federal law. RFRA's action on state law was the issue before the Supreme
Court in Flores. See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (discussing the significance
of whether RFRA was applied to state or federal law).
35. The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court
held in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), that, in addition to restricting
the federal government, this provision restricts the states by incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment.
36. "[Njor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 14 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,1903.
38. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
39. See id. at 2160.
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growing parish.' Accordingly, the Archbishop of San Antonio,
Bishop P.F. Flores, applied for a building permit so that the church
could be enlarged.41 Under a City of Boerne ordinance, the Historic
Landmark Commission was required to preapprove construction
affecting buildings in a historic district.42 The Commission, having
designated the area in which the church was located as a historic
district, denied the permit.43  The Archbishop brought suit,
challenging the denial of the permit.44 The Archbishop asserted,
among various claims,45 that the City's action violated RFRA because
the denial of the permit substantially burdened the Archbishop's
religious exercise.46  In response, the City challenged the
constitutionality of RFRA.47 In addition to arguing that Congress
lacked authority under § 5 to enact RFRA,"8 the City advanced three
arguments for finding RFRA unconstitutional: (1) RFRA violated
40. See icL
41. See id.
42. See id. The ordinance was enacted "in order to 'protect, enhance and perpetuate
selected historic landmarks' and to 'safeguard the City's historic and cultural heritage.'"
Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Boerne, Tex.,
Ordinance 91-05 (June 25, 1991)), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
43. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. In fact, Saint Peter Catholic Church itself was not
designated a historic landmark, but at least part of the church was in the historic district.
See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1354. The Archbishop claimed that only the facade was located in
the historic district, and that the facade would not be affected by the proposed addition.
See id. However, the City considered the whole building to be within the historic district.
See id.
44. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
45. The Archbishop asserted other claims in addition to a violation of RFRA,
including claims under the Free Exercise and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution,
and claims under the Texas Constitution. See Brief for the United States at 5 n.5, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074); Brief of Respondent Flores at 2,
Flores (No. 95-2074); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause); id. amend. V
(Takings Clause). At the time Flores was appealed to the Supreme Court, these claims
remained pending in the district court. See Brief of Respondent Flores at 2, Flores (No.
95-2074). The constitutionality of RFRA was the only issue considered by the Fifth
Circuit and the Supreme Court.
46. See Brief for the United States at 5, Flores (No. 95-2074). Forty to sixty more
worshipers than the existing Church building could accommodate attempted regularly to
attend Sunday Mass. See Brief of Respondent Flores at 1, Flores (No. 95-2074). After
the adverse ruling in the trial court, the Church began celebrating Mass in a secular
auditorium. See id. Without enlargement of the Church building, "[t]he Church [would]
be unable to accomplish its mission or continue to serve as a parish church," the
government argued. Brief for the United States at 5, Flores (No. 95-2074). RFRA
provided that one whose religious exercise had been "substantially burdened" by
government, in the absence of a compelling governmental interest obtained by the least
restrictive means, could assert the violation of RFRA as a claim in a judicial proceeding
and thereby obtain appropriate relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
47. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1354.
48. See id at 1356.
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the separation of powers doctrine; 49 (2) RFRA violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; 0 and (3) RFRA
violated the Tenth Amendment. 5 '.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas agreed with the City's assertion that RFRA was
unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers
doctrine. 2 Although the court acknowledged that Congress has
enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
court nevertheless found that Congress had violated the principle of
separation of powers "by intruding on the power and duty of the
judiciary" to interpret the Constitution.3 According to the district
court, Congress intended to overturn Supreme Court precedent when
it passed RFRA14 and attempted to "unconstitutionally change the
burden of proof as established under [Smith I1]" by requiring that
the compelling interest test be applied to all laws that substantially
49. See id. at 1361. The City argued that RFRA usurped the judiciary's authority to
say what the law is by reversing Smith II and restoring a standard of review for Free
Exercise claims that the Supreme Court had rejected. See id.
50. See id. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The City argued that
RFRA failed the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971), for determining Establishment Clause violations because RFRA
lacked a secular purpose and had the primary effect of advancing religion. See Flores, 73
F.3d at 1364.
51. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1361. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
City argued that RFRA limited the power of Congress to legislate in matters traditionally
left to state regulation. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1364.
52. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73
F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The Supreme Court ultimately
agreed that RFRA was unconstitutional, but the Court's reasoning was more subtle,
involving consideration of both separation of powers and federalism, in an analysis of the
scope of Congress's enforcement powers. See infra notes 260-370 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's analysis).
53. Flores, 877 F. Supp. at 357. The court was "cautious in its opinion of RFRA's
unconstitutionality" because there was little case law construing RFRA at that point. Id.
The court referred to one other district court opinion, in which the District Court for the
District of Hawaii had found RFRA to be a constitutional use of Congress's enforcement
power. See id.; Belgard v. Hawai'i, 883 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Haw. 1995). The Flores
court disagreed with the analysis of the Belgard court. See Flores, 877 F. Supp. at 357 n.1.
Specifically, the Flores court noted that RFRA itself did not mention § 5 as Congress's
empowering provision. See id. Moreover, the court questioned the legitimacy of RFRA
as applied to federal law, where § 5 power plays no role, because § 5 speaks only to
Congress's power vis-A-vis the states. See id.; infra note 262 (discussing arguments
regarding the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal laws).
54. See Flores, 877 F. Supp. at 357.
55. Id. at 358.
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burden religious exercise. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court,57 essentially adopting the argument advanced by Archbishop
Flores and the United States. 8 In the course of reversing the district
court, the Fifth Circuit shifted the focus of the analysis from the
separation of powers issue to the scope of Congress's § 5 powers. 9
First the court established that Congress did in fact have authority
under § 5 to enact RFRA. ° The court then noted that the City's
constitutional arguments opposing RFRA could not themselves
constitute independent bases for holding RFRA unconstitutional;
rather, they could constitute only potential limits on Congress's
authority under § 5,61 and Congress had not exceeded those limits by
enacting RFRA. 2
The Fifth Circuit addressed the City's separation of powers
argument at length.63 The court acknowledged that, under RFRA,
Congress required stricter judicial scrutiny of laws that created a
56. See icL In Smith II, the Supreme Court had limited the use of the heightened
compelling interest standard to the context of unemployment compensation only. See
Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I1), 394 U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990). For further discussion
of the compelling interest test and the Smith II decision, see infra notes 122-60 and
accompanying text.
57. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997).
58. The United States intervened on the side of plaintiff-appellant Flores. See Flores,
877 F. Supp. at 356.
59. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1356-61. The district court barely addressed the issue of
whether Congress had any authority to enact RFRA in the first place; the only mention of
the source of Congress's power was in a footnote that was primarily devoted to the
application of RFRA to federal laws. See Flores, 877 F. Supp. at 357 n.1. Thus, the
district court found RFRA to be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers
doctrine without analyzing whether Congress had the authority to pass RFRA in the first
instance.
60. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1356-61. The Fifth Circuit determined that Congress had
the authority to enact RFRA under § 5 by applying a test that the Supreme Court had
articulated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966).
61. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1361. Referring to the City's assertions that RFRA violated
the separation of powers doctrine, the Establishment Clause, and the Tenth Amendment,
the court stated: "The City treats these arguments as independent of its Section 5
argument .... However,... Congress has no power under Section 5 to violate other
individual rights. Stated another way, if RFRA violates other constitutional provisions, it
exceeds Congress' Section 5 authority." Id.
62. See id. at 1361-64.
63. See id. at 1361-63. Because the district court held RFRA unconstitutional as a
violation of the separation of powers, see Flores, 877 F. Supp at 357, it is not surprising
that the Fifth Circuit devoted the most time to refuting this proposition. The Fifth Circuit
dispensed with the Establishment Clause and Tenth Amendment arguments readily. See
Flores, 73 F.3d at 1364; infra note 73 (summarizing the court's holding). The Supreme
Court did not address the Establishment Clause or Tenth Amendment arguments.
1430 [Vol. 76
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substantial burden to religious free exercise than the Supreme Court
held was constitutionally required in Smith 11.'4 The Fifth Circuit
found Congress's enactment of RFRA comparable to Congress's
enactment of the Voting Rights Act (the "VRA"). 5 The Supreme
Court had upheld the constitutionality of the VRA,66 and the Fifth
Circuit reasoned by analogy that RFRA also was constitutional: Just
as Congress could permissibly dispense with a requirement of proof
of purposeful discrimination in voting procedures having an adverse
impact on minorities, so could Congress require the courts to
scrutinize neutral laws having an adverse impact on free religious
exercise, even in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination.6 7
According to the Fifth Circuit, Congress's changing the level of
scrutiny amounted to an accommodation of religion.' While the
court interpreted Smith 11 to stand for the proposition that the
64. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1361; see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-
86 (1990) (Smith II) (holding that requiring the state to show a compelling governmental
interest to justify a neutral regulation that burdened religion would create "a private right
to ignore generally applicable laws").
65. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994); Flores, 73 F.3d at 1360. For further
discussion of the Voting Rights Act, see infra notes 180-238 and accompanying text.
66. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966).
67. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1359-60. The Fifth Circuit cited City of Rome, 446 U.S. at
177, in which the Court upheld the provision of the VRA that prohibited the use of voting
procedures having either a discriminatory effect or purpose. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1360;
infra notes 198-223 and accompanying text (discussing City of Rome).
68. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362. RFRA accommodated religion by providing
additional protection (beyond what was constitutionally mandated) of free exercise
through the requirement that a substantial burden of free religious exercise must be
justified by a compelling state interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994); Flores, 73 F.3d at
1362-63.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that RFRA was unusual in its "codification of terms
drawn directly from constitutional decisions," but nonetheless held that this did not make
RFRA unconstitutional. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362. The court labeled RFRA a
"foundational statute." Id. But see Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 441-44 (arguing
that RFRA is not a foundational statute). Professors Eisgruber and Sager characterize
foundational statutes as those that "supplement ... the Court's constitutional judgment,"
and "offer the court conceptual room in which to give working content to [the statutes']
general precepts." Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 443. Such statutes may arise, for
example, in situations where the Court has held that certain conduct is constitutional, and
Congress acts to make that conduct illegal. See id. With the VRA, for example, Congress
banned the use of literacy tests after the Court had held that their use was not per se
unconstitutional, because Congress had good reason to believe that such tests were
regularly being used in a discriminatory manner. See id.; infra notes 180-238 and
accompanying text (discussing the VRA). Professors Eisgruber and Sager also cite Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), and the
Sherman Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), as classic examples of foundational statutes.
See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 443.
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Constitution does not require the government to accommodate
religion under neutral laws, it determined that Smith 11 did not
preclude the government's accommodation beyond what is
constitutionally mandated.69 In fact, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
Smith 11 Court intended to leave religious accommodation to the
political process7 and that the Supreme Court reaffirmed in post-
Smith 11 decisions that religious accommodations are not
unconstitutional. 71 The Fifth Circuit concluded that RFRA was a
constitutionally permissible religious accommodation and thus
determined that a choice by Congress to extend greater protection
than the Court had found to be constitutionally required does not
necessarily violate separation of powers.72 The Fifth Circuit also
69. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362; see also Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890 (determining that it
is preferable to leave the accommodation of religion to the political process). The First
Amendment's directives to government require certain accommodations in order to
satisfy the Free Exercise Clause, but prohibit others in order to comply with the
Establishment Clause. Somewhere in between there is room for government to elect
certain accommodations without violation of the Establishment Clause, or to choose not
to accommodate without violating the Free Exercise Clause; this is the area left open by
Smith II, according to the Fifth Circuit:
[T]he Court recognized that legislatures were free to enact religious exemptions
more expansive and accommodating than that required by the Free Exercise
Clause. Even when the Court held that a particular religious accommodation
violated the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan cautioned that "we in no
way suggest that all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon
individuals on account of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the
Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."
Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
70. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362. Quoting the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit stated:
"Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the
press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the
dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that
value in its legislation as well."
Id (quoting Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890); see also Berg, supra note 3, at 65-66 (arguing that
Smith II intentionally left the creation of religious exemptions to legislatures).
71. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362.
72. See id. at 1363 ("Every legislatively mandated accommodation of religion reflects
a legislature's judgment regarding the free exercise of religion.") A difficulty with RFRA
was that it was a "meta-accommodation," in that it did not create an exemption to a
particular law, but rather required that a certain level of judicial scrutiny be applied to
every law that created a burden on free exercise. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. The City
argued that because the Smith II Court had rejected application of the compelling interest
test, it was a violation of the separation of powers for Congress to attempt to reinstate
that test. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1363. The Fifth Circuit responded that the Smith II
Court's holding that such a test was not mandated by the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from restoring that test: "[I]t is one thing to apply the compelling interest test
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rejected the City's Establishment Clause and Tenth Amendment
arguments and held that RFRA was not unconstitutional. 73
The Supreme Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's analytical
framework74 but reversed, holding that Congress had in fact
exceeded its Enforcement Clause power.75 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority. 6 focused on the meaning of "enforce" as it appears
in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 In the analysis of this term,
the Court distinguished between remedial or preventive legislation
on the one hand, and substantive legislation on the other.78 Remedial
or preventive legislation-legislation that protects the
constitutionally guaranteed right to free exercise of religion-would
be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Enforcement
Clause; however, substantive legislation-legislation having the effect
of defining the constitutional right-would not constitute
"enforcement" and, therefore, would exceed Congress's power.79
The Court found support for this distinction in the text of the
drawn from a statute where Congress can amend the underlying law if it disagrees with
the resulting balance; it is another when the only response to the judiciary's application of
the compelling interest test is a constitutional amendment." Id.
73. See Flores, 73 F.3d at 1364. The Fifth Circuit countered the City's Establishment
Clause argument by pointing out that RFRA, by its own terms, provided that it would not
violate the Establishment Clause, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4; nor did RFRA, any more than
any other legislatively mandated religious accommodation, advance religion in violation
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), as the City had argued. See Flores, 73 F.3d at
1364. The Fifth Circuit disposed of the City's Tenth Amendment argument in an equally
abrupt manner, noting that "'the principles of federalism that constrain Congress's
exercise of its Commerce Clause powers are attenuated when Congress acts pursuant to
its powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments.'" Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452,468 (1991)).
74. The Supreme Court, like the Fifth Circuit, framed the issue as that of determining
the scope of Congress's § 5 powers. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-63. The separation of
powers issue was thus only one component of this analysis, and not the major issue in the
case.
75. See id. at 2160.
76. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
Scalia (except in Part II-A-1), Thomas, and Ginsburg. See id. at 2159. Justices Stevens
and Scalia filed concurring opinions. See id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. (Scalia,
J., concurring in part). Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter each wrote dissents. See
id at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 2186
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. See id at 2162-68.
78. See id at 2163-64.
79. See id. The terms "remedial" and "substantive" were used by Justice Harlan
writing in dissent in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666-68 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), and by subsequent commentators, see Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of
the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 589, 693 & n.421 (1996); infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text (discussing
Morgan).
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Fourteenth Amendment,"° in the history of enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment,8' and in the Court's prior case law.82
Examining the Fourteenth Amendment's history, the Court
found significance in the rejection of the first draft of what would
become the Fourteenth Amendment.' Unlike the adopted version
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to
enforce prohibitions against the states,84 the Bingham draft85 would
have given Congress primary responsibility for protecting civil
rights.86 Many members of Congress were concerned that the
Bingham draft gave too much power to Congress at the expense of
the states." Both Democrats and Republicans contended "that the
80. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163-64. Having noted that the text of § 5 gives Congress
the power to "enforce... the provisions of this article," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, the
Court stated that
Congress' power under § 5 ... extends only to "enforc[ing]" the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this power as "remedial."
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the
suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
81. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164-66; infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text
(summarizing the Court's review of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment's
enactment). The Court discussed the first draft of what would become the Fourteenth
Amendment, a draft that was rejected because it "gave Congress too much legislative
power at the expense of the existing constitutional structure." Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
Justice Scalia declined to join this section of the Court's opinion. See id. at 2160.
82- See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166-68; infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text
(summarizing the Court's analysis of prior case law). The Court found support for
limiting Congress's power in its earliest cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166, and in more recent cases in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the VRA, see id. at 2166-68; infra notes 180-238 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's VRA cases).
83. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
85. This draft was reported to the House of Representatives by Republican
Representative John Bingham of Ohio on behalf of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
86. See id "Bingham's first proposal would have placed on Congress the primary
responsibility of enforcing all civil rights so as to bring within federal jurisdiction most of
the offenses known to the criminal law, and many civil actions as well." ROBERT J.
HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 34 (1960). The Bingham draft read as follows:
"The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States; and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property."
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 813 (1866)). The
adopted form left the primary responsibility for protecting civil rights with the states, "but
empowered Congress to correct state acts of omission and commission by supplying
positive protection." HARRIS, supra, at 44.
87. See HARRIS, supra note 86, at 33 ("The implications of such a proposal with
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proposed Amendment would give Congress a power to intrude into
traditional areas of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the
federal design central to the Constitution. '88 Instead, Congress
adopted the present form of the amendment, with the result that
Congress's power was merely remedial, not plenary.s9 Thus, the
Court concluded, Congress elected to give itself only the power to
remedy constitutional violations, as defined by § 1 of the
Amendment, 0 and not the power to determine what constitutes a
violation of those substantive provisions.91
regard to congressional power and federalism were shocking to the moderates and even
to some Radicals ....").
88. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. The Court based this observation on the views
expressed by various members of the 39th Congress. See id. at 2164-65 (relying on CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-95 (1866)).
89. See id. at 2165. Thus, Congress has the power "to enforce ... the provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment]," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, rather than the broader
power encompassed by the Bingham draft, see supra note 86.
90. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2165; Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966
Sup. CT. REV. 79, 97 ("Nothing is clearer about the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment than that its framers rejected the option of an open-ended grant of power to
Congress to meddle with conditions within the states so as to render them equal in
accordance with its own notions.").
A contrary view of the significance of the change in language is offered by tenBroek.
See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 192-217 (1951) (arguing for a broader interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment). He argued that the fact that a "negative" form of the amendment was
substituted for the "positive" form is not dispositive of the intended meaning, and he
advanced a textual argument that Congress retained substantive power: § 5 would be
nugatory if Congress had no affirmative power. See id. at 204-05. tenBroek stated:
The only possible method by which Congress could by appropriate legislation
enforce section 1 would be itself to supply the protection to individuals which the
state had withheld .... From this, however, it would follow that, even granting
that section 1 does nothing more than forbid state acts, if section 5 is to be given
any meaning at all it must authorize Congress to legislate affirmatively for the
protection of individuals.
Id. The issue of the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to
congressional power is a matter of controversy.
The evidence in the debates with respect to the scope of congressional power to
secure the rights of persons and to enforce the equal protection clause is
inconclusive, and its weight is perhaps on the side of those who would confine
congressional power to legislation corrective of unequal state legislation, partial
administration of state laws, or failure to enforce them at all.
HARRIS, supra note 86, at 36-37. Professor Flack suggested that the framers intended to
create broad congressional power in the final form of the Amendment, despite the change
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According to the Court, the adopted form of the Fourteenth
Amendment "has proved significant" for maintaining the separation
of powers.92 The substantive provisions of § 1 are self-executing,
meaning that they are enforceable by the courts, not, as the Bingham
proposal would have provided, left to Congress to determine. 93
Congress, through the enforcement power granted by § 5, has the
power to remedy violations of § 1, while "[t]he power to interpret the
Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary. '94
Turning from this discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's
history to a discussion of prior case law, the Court found support in
its earliest Fourteenth Amendment cases for limiting Congress's § 5
enforcement power.95 The Court also discussed more recent cases, in
in language. See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 68-69 (1908). The change, Professor Flack argued, was not for the purpose
of changing the meaning, but to put the words in "such a form that the people might not
fully realize the power that was being conferred." Id. at 69.
Regardless of where one comes out on the proper meaning to give to the historical
debates, it is important to the Court's point that no one disputes the concern of many
members of the 39th Congress: They were concerned for the federal system, and hesitant
that a grant of too much power to Congress might result in a uniform, national law. See
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2165. "The Radical leaders were as aware as any one of the
attachment of a great majority of the people to the doctrine of States Rights [,] ... the
right of the States to regulate their own internal affairs." FLACK, supra, at 68; see
HARRIS, supra note 86, at 24-56; TENBROEK, supra, at 183-217.
92. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166.
93. See id ("The Bingham draft, some thought.... vest[ed] in Congress primary
power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new Amendment through
legislation."). The Court noted, however, that members of the 39th Congress were more
concerned with the Bingham proposal's threat to the federal balance than with its threat
to the separation of powers. See id. ("While this separation of powers aspect did not
occasion the wide-spread resistance which was caused by the proposal's threat to the
federal balance, it nonetheless attracted the attention of various Members."). But see
HARRIS, supra note 86, at 53-55 (noting the hostility of the Radical Republicans toward
the judiciary, and the reluctance of the Radicals to rely too heavily on the courts).
94. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166; see Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title HI: A Morganatic
Marriage, 1969 Sup. Cr. REv. 81, 83-93 (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend for Congress to have interpretive power, because that was the
role of the judiciary).
95. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166. The Court cited several cases in support of its
proposition that the nature of Congress's power to enforce the substantive provisions of
§ 1 is remedial and preventive, and inherently limited. See id. at 2166 (citing James v.
Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903) (striking a statute that punished individual, not state,
action that violated the Fifteenth Amendment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18-19
(1883) (striking legislation the Court found to be of a general, rather than corrective,
nature, and therefore inconsistent with Congress's limited enforcement power); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1883) (holding that legislation directed toward
individual action is not authorized by the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875) (holding that legislation
providing for punishment of offenses not limited to wrongful discrimination on account of
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which it was asked to determine the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the VRA.96 The Court characterized these cases as
confirming that the nature of Congress's enforcement power is
remedial and preventive.97 The Court emphasized that its case law
does not support any substantive, non-remedial power in Congress;
indeed, the Court had struck down legislation that it determined had
exceeded Congress's enforcement power.9 Thus, according to the
Court, its prior case law is consistent with the assertion that Congress
has the power to remedy or prevent constitutional violations, but
does not have the power to define constitutional violations.99
Within the category of remedial legislation, the Court had
recognized a prophylactic power of Congress: the power to legislate
against acts that are not necessarily unconstitutional, in order to
protect individuals against possible constitutional violations by the
race and similar immutable traits was beyond congressional authority under the Fifteenth
Amendment)). Although noting that subsequent cases have overruled or modified the
holdings of some of these early cases, the Court asserted that "their treatment of
Congress' § 5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been
questioned." Id. at 2166. Note that in addition to cases involving the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court relied on cases involving the
Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment, which has been construed similarly.
See infra note 178.
96. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167-68. The VRA is comprehensive legislation that was
designed to eliminate discrimination in voting against African-Americans. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994). Provisions of the VRA were challenged in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (plurality opinion), and City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 (1980), all of which the Court cited for support of its interpretation of the
meaning of "enforce." See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166-68. Some of the VRA cases involve
a parallel enforcement provision in the Fifteenth Amendment. See infra note 178. The
VRA and the cases involving it are discussed at greater length infra notes 180-238 and
accompanying text.
97. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167. The Court characterized the provisions of the VRA
as "new, unprecedented remedies" and "strong remedial and preventive measures" made
necessary by the long history of racial discrimination in voting. Id. (emphasis added).
RFRA supporters argued that the VRA and RFRA were analogous statutes: that RFRA
protected religious freedom in the same way that the VRA had protected the right to
vote. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. RBv.
145, 152-53 (1995). But the Court distinguished the two statutes on the grounds that,
while the VRA was remedial, RFRA was substantive legislation. See infra notes 293-332
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis of RFRA).
98. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167-77 (discussing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117-18, in which
the Court struck down legislation lowering the minimum voting age in state elections, and
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658, in which the Court upheld a section of the VRA as "appropriate
legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause," and disavowing any language in
Morgan that suggested Congress had the power to expand the rights defined in § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
99. See id. at 2164.
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states.100 The hard cases, then, fall within this prophylactic area. The
Court must distinguish legislation that only slightly and permissibly
"overprotects" constitutional rights from legislation that
substantively changes the meaning of the Constitution and treads on
state autonomy.'0'
To determine the line separating permissible prophylactic power
from impermissible substantive interpretation, the Court articulated
a test: The means employed by the legislation must be proportional
to the ends the legislation is designed to accomplish.1 2 The greater
the danger of unconstitutional behavior, the more demanding the
preventive legislation can be; but if Congress enacts demanding
legislation in the face of an unlikely threat, then Congress effectively
changes the Constitution.03 The Court held that RFRA, falling into
the latter category, had crossed the line.'04 Noting the lack of recent
examples of purposeful religious discrimination'05 and expressing
100. See id. at 2163 ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres
of autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445,455 (1976))).
As an example of Congress's use of its prophylactic power, the Court mentioned the
provision of the VRA that bans the use of literacy tests. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973b).
The Court had earlier upheld the use of literacy tests in Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), while acknowledging that the discriminatory
application of such tests is unconstitutional. See id. at 53. Because such tests had been
widely used in a discriminatory manner, the Court recognized Congress's authority to
suspend the use of the tests, pursuant to Congress's enforcement power under the
Fifteenth Amendment, without requiring proof of discriminatory application. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333-34. Thus, Congress was allowed to prohibit
conduct that was not necessarily unconstitutional. See infra notes 188-97 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress's prophylactic power).
101. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 ("While the line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the
governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed.").
102. See id. ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.").
103. See id. at 2166-68.
104. See id. at 2169-71. The Court asserted that "RFRA ... cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 2170.
105. The Court observed that the record before Congress when it passed RFRA did
not contain any modem examples of generally applicable laws that were passed because
of religious bigotry. See id. at 2169. Episodes of religious persecution cited in the
legislative record had occurred at least 40 years prior to Congress's consideration of
RFRA. See id.
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concern over the expansive scope of RFRA,106 the Court concluded
that RFRA was not a proportional response to the ends it was
designed to effect; RFRA was not remedial legislation, but legislation
that had the effect of changing constitutional protections.' 7  The
Court therefore concluded that Congress had exceeded its power
when it enacted RFRA and struck down RFRA in its entirety. 08
Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's opinion, although
she did not disagree with the Court's analysis of the scope of
Congress's § 5 power. 09 She dissented because she believed that
Smith II was wrongly decided and should therefore not have formed
the basis for the majority's holding.10 Justice O'Connor's dissent was
primarily devoted to a historical analysis of the Free Exercise
Clause."' Justice Scalia concurred solely for the purpose of refuting
Justice O'Connor's historical analysis.' Justices Souter and Breyer
also dissented, without expressing any opinion as to the validity of
the Court's § 5 analysis." They dissented because they, like Justice
O'Connor, believed that Smith II should have been reconsidered."4
106. The Court was concerned that RFRA implicated every sort of law, at every level
of government, and had no geographic or temporal limitations. See id. at 2170; infra notes
308-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's concern with RFRA's expansive
scope).
107. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. The Court stated that
RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are
to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.
Id.
108. See id. at 2172. Because the Court addressed only Congress's authority to pass
RFRA as RFRA applied to the states, the decision is ambiguous with regard to whether
RFRA applied only to federal laws is unconstitutional.
109. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I agree with much of the reasoning set
forth in Part III-A of the Court's opinion. Indeed, if I agreed with the Court's standard in
Smith [I], I would join the opinion.").
110. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor would have used Flores to
reexamine the Court's Smith Hlholding. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 2178-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the
Smith 11 holding is not supported by this history. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She
also stated that Smith H departed from the Court's precedent. See id. at 2177-78
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("I write to respond briefly to the
claim of Justice [O'Connor's] dissent.., that historical materials support a result contrary
to the one reached in [Smith I].").
113. See id. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer specifically stated that he did not see any need to reach the issue of
congressional authority, in light of his view that Smith II should have been reconsidered.
See id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. See id- at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1439
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Despite the fact that the majority did not dwell on religion,"' the
Court's free exercise jurisprudence is an important aspect of the
Flores decision because it was in reaction to the Court's First
Amendment case law that Congress enacted RFRA. 16 Many
commentators believed that the Employment Division v. Smith
(Smith II) 11 decision marked a sharp departure from the Court's free
exercise precedent."' With RFRA, Congress attempted to mitigate
the harm it believed the Supreme Court caused with Smith I1.119
Justice Souter was not prepared to join either Justice O'Connor's opinion rejecting the
Smith II rule, or the majority's opinion, which was based on the assumption that the Smith
II rule was correct, in the absence of briefing on the issue by the parties. See id. at 2186
(Souter, J., dissenting). He nevertheless stated that he had doubts, intensified by the
historical arguments of Justices O'Connor and Scalia, about the soundness of the Smith H
rule. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting);, see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,564-77 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (explaining why, in his view, the Smith II decision could and should be
reconsidered).
115. Ironically perhaps, the case was not about religion, at least not for the majority.
The majority considered religion only to the extent necessary to determine if RFRA
satisfied its test for remedial legislation under § 5. Thus, the Court reviewed its Free
Exercise standard as announced in Smith 11. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-61. Then, with
Smith II as the reference point for what the Constitution requires, the Court evaluated the
legislative record regarding constitutional violations and RFRA's provisions for
preventing those purported violations. See id. at 2168-72.
The parties to the case briefed the issue of whether RFRA violated the
Establishment Clause. See Brief for Petitioner at 46-49, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief of
Respondent Flores at 46-49, Flores (No. 95-2074); Brief for the United States at 40-44,
Flores (No. 95-2074). The petitioner's argument that RFRA violated the Establishment
Clause was adopted by Justice Stevens in his concurrence, see Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172
(Stevens, J., concurring), but the issue was not mentioned in the opinion of the Court.
Justice Stevens argued that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause because RFRA
provided potential exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious actors, but not
for nonreligious ones. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Stevens argued, if
an atheist had been denied a permit to expand a museum or an art gallery, RFRA would
not be available as a weapon, and "[tihis governmental preference for religion, as
opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
116. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
118. Actually, a long line of Supreme Court cases prior to Smith 11 rejected free
exercise claims. See Lupu, supra note 7, at 261 (listing cases); Michael W. McConnell,
Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of
Religion?, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 181,183 (1992) (same). But these cases could be
categorized and dismissed as exceptions: "an Indians case, a military case, a Muslims-in-
prison case" Lupu, supra note 7, at 261. It was the general nature of the rule of Smith II
that raised concern. See id.; see also infra notes 143, 153 (discussing the difference in
viewpoint regarding whether Smith II departed significantly from precedent).
119. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 7-9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897-
98 (describing the impact of the Smith H decision and the intended effect of RFRA);
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 441 (characterizing RFRA as a congressional attempt
to undo a Supreme Court decision).
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Indeed, an express purpose of RFRA was to restore the free exercise
standard that the Court had used in two cases preceding Smith II:
Sherbert v. Verner" and Wisconsin v. Yoder.
121
In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that if a state law burdened
an individual's free exercise of religion, then the state must justify
that burden with a compelling interest." In the case, a Seventh-Day
Adventist was fired from her job in a textile mill when she refused to
work on Saturdays, the day of her Sabbath.' 3 Unable to obtain
another job because of her inability to work on Saturdays, she filed
for unemployment benefits.' 4 The South Carolina Employment
Security Commission found that the plaintiff "was unavailable for
work" and denied unemployment benefits."z The Supreme Court of
South Carolina ultimately affirmed the Commission's decision,
holding that the plaintiff's constitutional liberties were not infringed
because she was not actually prevented from exercising her right to
practice religion or observing her religious beliefs. 26
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court.2  The Court acknowledged that the
government may regulate certain conduct prompted by religious
belief or principles,'" but held that Mrs. Sherbert's conscientious
120. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
121. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The first stated purpose of RFRA was "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994).
122. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
123. See Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737, 737-38 (S.C. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). The employee had worked at the mill for approximately 35 years. See id. at 737.
About two years prior to her discharge, she became a Seventh-Day Adventist. See id. at
738. At that time, Saturday work was on a voluntary basis. See id The employer began
requiring Saturday work, and when the employee refused to work, she was discharged.
See id. at 737-38.
124. The plaintiff applied for a job at three other textile plants, but these, like most of
the textile plants in the area, required employees to work on Saturday. See id. at 738.
125. See id. Under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law, being
unavailable for work was grounds for disqualifying an otherwise insured worker for
benefits. See id. at 739.
126. See id. at 746 (noting that the statute "places no restriction upon the appellant's
freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and
freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her
conscience").
127. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
128. See id. at 403. For example, the Court has upheld a law prohibiting polygamy,
while refusing to grant an exemption from that law to one whose religious beliefs
embraced polygamy. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878); see also
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601, 609 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws as
applied to orthodox Jews, who claimed such laws infringed their free exercise rights);
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objection to working on Saturday was distinguishable.12 9  Thus, the
Court stated, if Mrs. Sherbert's free exercise was burdened, then the
government must justify imposing that burden by advancing a
compelling interest.130 The Court held that the appellant's free
exercise of religion was burdened 131 and rejected as less than
compelling the interests advanced by the State of South Carolina. 132
The holding of Sherbert was reaffirmed a decade later in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.33 The Court cited Sherbert for the proposition
that "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.' '1  In
Yoder, Amish parents had refused to send their children to school
beyond the eighth grade and were convicted of violating Wisconsin's
compulsory school-attendance law. 35 The parents claimed that the
application of that law to them violated their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.'36 Despite the importance
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,20 (1946) (upholding conviction under the Mann
Act against a defense of religious belief); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944) (holding that a child labor law is enforceable against a claim that such enforcement
regulates religious conduct of the parent).
129. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 ("Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection
to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within
the reach of state legislation.").
130. See id. The Court stated that
[i]f ... the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand
appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her
disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her
constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the
free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a "compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate."
Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
131. See id. at 403-06. Appellant was burdened by being put in the position of having
to choose between her religious convictions and her state unemployment benefits. See id.
at 404.
132. See id. at 406-09. The interests advanced by the state were guarding against the
filing of fraudulent claims in order to avoid diluting the benefits fund and preventing
hindrance of the employer's scheduling of Saturday work. See id. at 407.
133. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
134. Id. at 220.
135. See id. at 207 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 1969) (current version at
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 1991))).
136. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-09 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). The Amish had a
unique lifestyle, and it was necessary that children in their formative years remain in the
community in order to acquire the attitudes and skills appropriate to Amish life;
moreover, formal high school education would expose Amish children to an environment
hostile to Amish beliefs. See id. at 209-13. The Amish believed that "enforcement of the
State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely
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of the State's interest in educating all of its children, the Court held
that this interest "is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment." '137 Applying the Sherbert test, the Court held that
application of the compulsory attendance law to the Amish
constituted a significant burden on their free exercise rights138 and
that the State's interest was not sufficiently compelling. 39
By many accounts, Sherbert and Yoder established an approach
that the Court would consistently take in interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause in the period following Sherbert.'40 Under this
approach, "a burden on the free exercise of religion is constitutional
only if there is a compelling governmental interest that justifies that
burden."'' Thus, many were surprised when the Court, in
Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II),142 rejected the use of its
compelling interest test when the laws involved are neutral and of
general applicability. 4 3
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of [their] religious beliefs." Id. at 219.
137. Id. at 214.
138. See id. at 219.
139. See id. at 221-29.
140. See Conkle, supra note 4, at 55-56; Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The
RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 65, 85-86 (1996); Rex E.
Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review,
1993 BYU L. REv. 73, 84-85; McConnell, supra note 118, at 181-82.
141. McConnell, supra note 118, at 181-82. The Court did make exceptions to its use
of the compelling interest test for military and prison regulations. See Conkle, supra note
4, at 56; Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 85.
142. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Smith II).
143. See id. at 878-89. The decision was characterized as "dramatic and
unanticipated," Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 93, and as a sharp departure
from precedent, see McConnell, supra note 118, at 183. Some commentators, however,
remarked that Smith H did not effect the abrupt change in the law that post-Smith II
rhetoric suggests. See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 121. Professor Tushnet cited a Ninth
Circuit decision in which Judge John T. Noonan collected 72 courts of appeals cases
raising free exercise claims, of which only seven (9%) prevailed. See id. at 121 n.14
(citing EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 627-29 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Noonan, J., dissenting)). Out of 17 Supreme Court cases decided between 1963 and 1990
involving free exercise claims, the free exercise claim prevailed in only four (23%). See
id. at 121; see also James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1458-62 (1992) (compiling similar
statistics). But see Lee, supra note 140, at 86-87 ("If the Smith [I] approach survives, it
will work some very large changes in existing free exercise jurisprudence.").
Professor McConnell conceded that, in many cases, the Supreme Court held against
the free exercise claimant, either because the Court found an insufficient burden on the
individual's free exercise, or because the government successfully demonstrated a
compelling interest. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1990). At least one commentator has suggested
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The facts in Smith 11 resembled those of Sherbert, in that
discharged employees were seeking unemployment benefits.144 In
Smith I and Smith II, the employees had been fired because they used
peyote, a felony under Oregon law.145 Although their use of peyote
was for sacramental purposes, they were denied unemployment
benefits because they had been discharged for work-related
misconduct. 146 The Smith I and Smith 11 employees claimed that they
were being denied benefits because of their religious beliefs and cited
Sherbert as precedent for holding that they were entitled to
benefits.147
The Supreme Court refrained the issue. First, the Court noted
that Oregon law prohibited even the sacramental use of peyote.'
The question, then, was whether the federal Constitution protects the
sacramental use of peyote. If the United States Constitution does not
that the Court used a more lenient standard of review than the compelling interest
standard. See Conkle, supra note 4, at 56. Even so, the Court did use heightened
scrutiny, and "[t]here is no support in the precedents for the Court to replace the prior
test with nothing more than the toothless rationality review that is applicable to all
legislation." McConnell, supra, at 1128.
144. See Smith 1, 494 U.S. at 874. The employees in this case, Alfred Smith and Galen
Black, had been employed by a nonprofit corporation (the Douglas County Council on
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment, or "ADAPT") that provided
treatment for alcohol and drug abusers. See Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 1), 485
U.S. 660,662 (1988).
145. See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 874. Both Smith and Black formerly had drug or alcohol
dependencies, a fact that partially qualified them to be counselors for ADAPT. See Smith
1, 485 U.S. at 662. ADAPT policy required that counselors such as Smith and Black
refrain from the use of alcohol and illegal drugs. See id. at 662 & n.3. Smith and Black,
members of the Native American Church, each had ingested peyote for sacramental
purposes. See id. at 663. Their employment was therefore terminated because this
violated ADAPT policy. See id. at 662-63.
Oregon law prohibits possession of a "controlled substance" unless prescribed by a
medical practitioner. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987) (current version at OR.
REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1995)). Peyote is included in the class of "controlled
substances." See OR. ADMIN. R. 855-080-0021(3)(s) (1988) (current version at OR.
ADMIN. R. 855-080-0021(3)(s) (1997)). Violation of this prohibition constitutes a Class B
felony. See OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987) (current version at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 475.992(4)(a) (1995)). After the Smith IH decision, Oregon enacted a religious
exemption. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1997); William W. Van Alstyne, The
Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 DuKE L.J. 291, 304 n.35 (1996).
146. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 874; Smith I, 485 U.S. at 663-64 & n.6; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 657.176(2)(a)-(b) (1987) (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a)-(b)
(1995)); OR. ADMN. R. 471-030-0038(3) (1987) (current version at OR. ADMIN. R. 471-
030-0038(3) (1997)).
147. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 874-75.
148. See id. at 876. This was the issue for the Oregon Supreme Court to determine on
remand of Smith L See supra note 8. Oregon now has a religious exemption for peyote
use. See supra note 145.
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forbid Oregon from prohibiting the use of peyote for sacramental
purposes, the Court reasoned, then the state may deny benefits to
one who has used peyote; if the conduct can be made criminal,
consistently with the federal Constitution, then it certainly can be the
basis for denying benefits.149
The Court thus found a critical distinction between Smith II and
Sherbert: The conduct that formed the basis for the employee
discharge in Smith 11 was criminal, while that in Sherbert was not.Y0
Thus, Sherbert did not control the issue in Smith II; rather, the issue
was whether Oregon could, consistently with the First Amendment,
make the use of peyote criminal, even though such a law would
adversely impact the religious practices of Native Americans.' The
Court held that Oregon constitutionally could prohibit the use of
peyote and that it therefore also constitutionally could deny
unemployment benefits when dismissal resulted from use of that
drug. 52
According to the Court, its Smith II decision conformed to its
earlier precedents, which consistently held that individuals must
comply with "'valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability.' "153
The only exceptions to this general principle that the Court
recognized form a small group of cases presenting what the Court
termed a "hybrid" situation. 4 Such hybrid cases, of which Yoder is
an example, involve both the Free Exercise Clause and another
constitutional protection.55 Evidently, the presence of the additional
149. See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 875.
150. See id. at 876.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 890.
153. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment)). The Court stated that "the record of more than a century"
of its free exercise jurisprudence contradicted the proposition that "an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. at 878-79. Thus, in the Court's view,
Sherbert was an exception to a long line of precedent. Smith ITs critics, on the other
hand, claimed that Smith HI was a sharp break with precedent. See, e.g., Gressman &
Carmella, supra note 140, at 90 n.104 (observing that criticism of Smith II on the basis of
its inconsistency with prior case law is well-founded); William P. Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHm. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) (arguing that
"[Smith I!'s] use of precedent borders on fiction"); McConnell, supra note 143, at 1124-27
(describing the precedents relied upon in Smith II and criticizing the Court's use of those
precedents because they had been repudiated or were inapposite).
154. See Smith 1, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
155. Yoder involved Amish parents' right to educate their children in accordance with
their religious principles; thus, free exercise rights were joined by the right of parents "to
direct the education of their children." Id. at 881; see also supra notes 133-39 and
accompanying text (discussing Yoder). In the Smith I1 Court's words:
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constitutional protection beyond the Free Exercise Clause is what
triggered heightened scrutiny by the Court.156  Smith II did not
present such a hybrid situation and therefore did not escape the
operation of the rule that generally applicable laws apply equally to
all, regardless of incidental burdens to religious exercise.157
The Court put Sherbert and subsequent cases involving
unemployment benefits into a class by themselves, explaining that it
had "never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the
Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.
1 58
Thus, only for such specialized cases is the Sherbert balancing test
required.159  As discussed above, the Court framed the issue
presented in Smith II in such a way as to make Sherbert inapposite.
Therefore, Smith 11 fell into that general category of cases that would
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press ... or the right of parents ... to direct the education of their
children.
Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
156. See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 881 & n.1; cf. Mary McCrory Krupnow, Note, M.L.B. v.
S.LJ.: Protecting Familial Bonds and Creating a New Right of Access in the Civil Courts,
76 N.C. L. REV. 621, 645 (1998) (providing an example of a combination of equal
protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process concerns yielding
heightened scrutiny).
157. "There being no contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to
regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's
children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly
controls." Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 882.
158. Id. at 883.
159. See id. at 882-85. The Court acknowledged that it had applied the Sherbert test in
other contexts, but compelling governmental interests always were demonstrated and,
therefore, the challenged laws were applied to the religious objectors. See id. at 883.
Further, the Court in recent years had refrained completely from applying the test outside
the unemployment compensation context. See id. The Court explained at length why the
use of the Sherbert test should remain confined to the unemployment compensation
context, or at least not be applied to require exemptions from generally applicable
criminal laws. See id. at 884-90. The most significant reason weighing against the general
use of the Sherbert compelling interest test was the potential impact, given the diversity of
religious beliefs in American society, of permitting exemptions to general laws. See id. at
888-89. Such a rule could result in exemptions from
civic obligations of every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military
service to the payment of taxes to health and safety regulation such as
manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws,
and traffic laws, to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child
labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws
providing for equality of opportunity for the races. The First Amendment's
protection of religious liberty does not require this.
Id (citations omitted).
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be judged according to the new free exercise standard: So long as a
law is neutral and of general applicability, it need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest, even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.160
The response to "the Court's dramatic and unanticipated
rejection of balancing as the interpretive approach to the Free
Exercise Clause"'61 was immediate and critical.162  Legal scholars
accused the Court of abandoning precedent 63 and of misinterpreting
the First Amendment and its history3 64 Members of Congress
lamented the loss of protection for religious freedoms and raised
concerns that the free exercise of religion would be threatened. 65
Several law professors and a number of organizations joined the
petition for rehearing of Smith 11;166 when the Supreme Court refused
160. See id. at 878.
161. Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 93.
162. See Berg, supra note 3, at 12; Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 93.
Although most scholars are critical of Smith II, there are a few who, although they might
take issue with the opinion itself, believed the result was correct. See Wayne
McCormack, Subsidies for Expression and the Future of Free Exercise, 1993 BYU L. REV.
327, 327 ("Along with maybe a handful of others, I tentatively believe that Justice Scalia
may have been right in Smith [II], despite the manifold problems with the opinion."
(footnote omitted)).
163. See supra notes 143, 153 (discussing whether Smith II is a sharp departure from
precedent).
164. Whether the decision is correct in its interpretation of the First Amendment is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right
of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992)
(presenting a historical argument that the Free Exercise Clause does not provide a
constitutional right to religious exemption from civil laws, thereby supporting the result of
Smith II); Marshall, supra note 153, at 308 (1991) (defending Smith Iis rejection of
constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions, while criticizing the opinion itself);
McConnell, supra note 118, at 181-87 (criticizing Smith 11 as being inconsistent with the
text and history of the First Amendment, as well as with Supreme Court precedent);
Tushnet, supra note 7, at 129-38 (defending the doctrinal outcome of Smith II as more
respectful of religious exercise than the pre-Smith II approach).
165. See S. REP. No. 103-11, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897
("By lowering the level of constitutional protection for religious practices, the decision
has created a climate in which the free exercise of religion is jeopardized."); H.R. REP.
No. 103-88, at 5 (1993) ("[Tlhe Smith [H/] decision has created a climate in which the free
exercise of religion is continually in jeopardy."). Congress held several hearings in the
course of considering various versions of RFRA, generating pages of testimony regarding
the threat to religious liberty in America as a result of the Smith II decision. See The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on
H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on
H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990).
166. See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the
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to reconsider its decision, 167 "a broad-based coalition of religious and
civil liberties groups formed to pursue the next alternative, restoring
religious freedom by statute.' 1
Although two attempts at statutory redress were unsuccessful,169
RFRA became law on November 16, 1993.170 RFRA was backed by a
diverse171 yet fragile coalition.72 Because of the differing views of the
groups within the coalition, the goals of RFRA had to be kept
general in order to maintain the support necessary to obtain passage
of the act.173 RFRA eventually emerged' 74 with the stated goal of
Amicus Brief That Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 99-100 & nn.2-3 (1990).
167. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 913, denying reh'g of 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
168. Berg, supra note 3, at 12.
169. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 was considered by the 101st
Congress as H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (1990), and S. 3254, 101st Cong. (1990). See
Whitbeck, supra note 6, at 846-48. It died at the end of the 101st Congress, however,
because legislators did not have adequate time to consider it. See id. at 848 & n.157.
What began as the RFRA of 1991, H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. (1991), was delayed in passage
by various concerns, including fears on the part of some members that it created a
statutory right to abortion; this fear was based on an untested claim by pro-choice groups
that the right to abortion was protected by the Free Exercise Clause. See Whitbeck, supra
note 6, at 848-55. Although HFRA supporters attempted to expedite procedures to bring
the bill to the House floor before the end of the 102d Congress, they were unsuccessful.
See id. at 855.
170. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
171. See Berg, supra note 3, at 13; Conkle, supra note 4, at 40, 88-89; Douglas Laycock
& Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV.
209, 210-11 (1994); McConnell, supra note 118, at 187.
172. The secular civil liberties groups were concerned with protecting members of
minority religious groups from the operation of neutral laws passed by legislative
majorities; at the same time, however, these groups were wary of allowing too much
entanglement of church and state. See Berg, supra note 3, at 13. The religious groups had
widely varying attitudes regarding government support for religion, but were united in
eschewing "Smith [11]'s proposition that religious conscience must be subordinate even to
modest secular interests of government." Id. "To preserve maximum political
attractiveness, the RFRA coalition decided that the most promising route was to design
and market the statute primarily as a simple restoration of previously existing free
exercise rights." Id. at 14.
The major opposition to RFRA was due to the abortion issue. See id. at 15;
Whitbeck, supra note 6, at 849-51, 855-56; supra note 169 (describing the abortion issue).
The Catholic Church also expressed some concern that RFRA might be used to attack tax
exemptions and government funding of religious organizations. See Berg, supra note 3, at
15.
173. See Berg, supra note 3, at 14.
174. Since RFRA had bipartisan support from the start, only relatively minor
amendments to the language were necessary to address the concerns of the various
factions within the coalition; once these concerns were allayed, RFRA was passed easily
into law during the 103d Congress. See Berg, supra note 3, at 17; Whitbeck, supra note 6,
at 855-63. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. (1993), sailed through the House, see Whitbeck, supra
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"restor[ing] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and [of] guarant[ying] its application
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.' 75
Although religious issues were the catalyst for the Flores
decision, the key issue before the Court was the scope of Congress's
enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 176 The
Enforcement Clause gives Congress the power to "enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment].' 17 7 Prior to Flores, this power17 had been explored in
a series of cases deciding the constitutionality of certain provisions of
the VRA.179
South Carolina v. Katzenbach'80 presented the first challenge to
the VRA,l sl with the State alleging that several of its provisions were
unconstitutional."w In particular, South Carolina challenged a
note 6, at 857-58. Its companion bill, S. 578, 103d Cong. (1993), after minor amendment,
was passed by the Senate with a vote of 97-3. See Whitbeck, supra note 6, at 858-63. The
House considered and accepted the Senate amendment, and President Clinton signed the
bill into law on November 16,1993. See id. at 863.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (citations omitted).
176. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
177. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
178. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments both have Enforcement Clauses,
which are almost identical. The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Enforcement Clause of the
Fifteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. The Court has construed them
similarly. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as coextensive."); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) ("The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of
Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States."); see also Lee, supra note
140, at 92 ("Both South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome suggest, at least by
implication, that the enforcement powers of each of the reconstruction amendments are
coextensive. Since the language of each of the enforcement provisions is identical, no
reason exists to believe that this implication is not, in fact, explicit."). But see Marci A.
Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse
Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 357, 376
(1994) ("The discussion over RFRA has presumed that there is no meaningful difference
between the two enforcement provisions. There is, however, a decisive difference
between the two on the question of whether Congress may regulate itself.").
179. The Voting Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
180. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
181. See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U.
CiN. L. REv. 199,226 (1971).
182 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307, 315-16. South Carolina
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provision imposing a ban on all voting tests or devices in covered
states,'1 as this provision had the effect of temporarily barring South
Carolina's enforcement of a statute that required its citizens to pass a
literacy test in order to register to vote.184
The effect of the VRA was to preempt South Carolina's use of
certain voting procedures, in advance of any judicial finding that
these procedures were discriminatory."8 South Carolina objected on
the grounds that Congress had usurped the power of the judiciary.'86
The Court rejected South Carolina's argument, holding that
Congress, as well as the courts, has the power to fashion and apply
specific remedies designed to protect Fifteenth Amendment rights.18
With South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court first recognized
Congress's permissible use of the prophylactic power: Congress has
the authority under the Enforcement Clause to prohibit conduct that
challenged 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)-(d), 1973c, 1973d(b), 1973e, 1973g, 1973i, 1973j(a)-(c),
1973k(a), and certain procedural portions of § 1973L See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 316-17.
The Court did not consider the challenge to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i, 1973j(a)-(c) because it
was "premature." See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 317. Section 1973b defines the covered
regions, and suspends literacy tests in those regions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b. Section 1973c
requires that a covered state, before instituting new voting regulations, obtain
preclearance by the U.S. Attorney General or a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia that the new regulation does not have discriminatory
purpose, and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote. See id.
§ 1973c. Sections 1973d(b), 1973e, 1973g, and 1973k(a) all involve the assignment of
federal examiners to supervise elections. See id. §§ 1973d(b), 1973e, 1973g, 1973k(a). See
generally Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-23 (discussing these statutory provisions).
183. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 319. Section 1973b(a) of the VRA provides that "no
citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of
his failure to comply with any test or device in any [covered] State." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(a). Certain provisions of the VRA apply only to states or political subdivisions of
a state-known as "covered areas"-that had engaged in voting discrimination prior to
passage of the VRA, as measured by § 1973b(b) of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b);
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 317-19. South Carolina had been designated a "covered" state.
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 318.
184. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 319.
185. South Carolina relied on an earlier Supreme Court holding in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at
333. In Lassiter, the Court held that a literacy test applied to all voters does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 50-53, and the use of literacy tests
does not necessarily violate the Fifteenth Amendment, see id. at 53-54. Nevertheless the
Lassiter Court noted that "a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate
that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot." Id. at 53.
186. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325.
187. See id. at 327 ("We ... reject South Carolina's argument that Congress may
appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in
general terms-that the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to
particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the courts.").
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has not been found to be unconstitutional by a court. 8 Despite the
fact that a constitutional violation need not be proven in advance of
the legislation's operation against the states, the Court characterized
the VRA as "remedial."'89 Moreover, the Court recognized broad
authority in Congress to act under its remedial power by announcing
a loose standard of review of congressional acts pursuant to the
enforcement power.90 The standard by which the Court judged the
appropriateness of this enforcement legislation was the M'Culloch v.
Maryland'9' standard for the Necessary and Proper Clause:19 "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."' 93 Noting the extensive
record that Congress had assembled when it enacted the voting rights
legislation, 94 the Court determined that the VRA's temporary
suspension of literacy tests and similar devices in covered areas' 95 was
"a legitimate response to the problem, for which there [was] ample
precedent in Fifteenth Amendment cases." 96 Thus, the Court held
that Congress had not exceeded its power under the Enforcement
188. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163; see also Cox, supra note 181, at 226-27 (observing
that the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach upheld the prohibition by Congress of
conduct that had not been proven to violate the Fifteenth Amendment); Matt Pawa,
Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save
Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029,
1059-62 (1993) (describing the broad powers of Congress under the Enforcement Clause,
including the power to prohibit conduct that is not unconstitutional).
189. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
190. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 181, at 226 ("South Carolina v. Katzenbach laid the
foundation for the exercise of broad congressional authority under section 5." (citation
omitted)); Lee, supra note 140, at 92 (describing the "breadth" of Congress's enforcement
power); Pawa, supra note 188, at 1059 ("[A] series of cases involving conflicts over
federal voting-rights laws... interpret Congress's powers very broadly.").
191. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
193. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
at 326.
194. The record detailed the history of racial discrimination in voting by some of the
southern states, including repeated violations of and litigation under the Fifteenth
Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15. In particular, this
record demonstrated that in South Carolina, literacy tests had regularly been used to
discriminate against African-Americans. See id. at 333-34.
195. See supra note 183 (defining covered areas).
196. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334. Congress made findings that in
most of the covered states, these tests had been applied in a discriminatory fashion, in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 333-34. Presumably then, the VRA
acted to prohibit the use of literacy tests in some areas where there was no evidence that
the tests had been applied in a discriminatory manner.
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Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.197
The Court reaffirmed its South Carolina v. Katzenbach holding
in City of Rome v. United States.98 The City of Rome, Georgia, had
made changes in its electoral system 9 9 Pursuant to the VRA, the
City submitted the changes to the Attorney General of the United
States for preclearance.2' The Attorney General refused to preclear
some of the changes for certain elections. 10' The City brought suit in
federal district court,202 and the district court granted summary
judgment for the United States.20 3 The court found that, while the
contested changes were not made for a discriminatory purpose, they
did have a discriminatory effect.2 4
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City argued that Congress
had exceeded its authority by requiring that, in order to obtain
preclearance, a voting practice be neither discriminatory in purpose
nor in effect.2 5 The City maintained that the Supreme Court had
197. See id. at 308.
198. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
199. See City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221,224 (D.D.C. 1979), affd, 446
U.S. 156 (1980). The changes included reducing the size and method of election of the
Rome Commission and increasing the size and method of election of the Board of
Education. See id.
200. See id at 227-29.
201. See id. at 229.
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
203. See City of Rome, 472 F. Supp. at 249.
204. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1980). Under the VRA,
the fact that a change would have a discriminatory effect alone was enough to justify
withholding preclearance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172-73.
205. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173. The City argued that the Court need not reach
the merits of the case, because the City was not subject to the VRA. See id. at 162. The
City argued that it had satisfied the conditions of the so-called "bailout" provisions, under
which a state or political subdivision can end its preclearance obligations through a
declaratory judgment from the District Court of the District of Columbia. See id. at 162-
67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)). The Court held that the bailout provision was available
only to the state, and not to the individual political subdivisions. See id. at 167-69.
Alternatively, the City argued that the Court need not reach the merits because the
Attorney General, by not responding to the City's preclearance request in a timely
manner, effectively precleared the regulations at issue. See id. at 170-72. The Court
rejected this argument as well, see id. at 171, and reached the merits.
On the merits, in addition to its argument that Congress exceeded its authority by
prohibiting electoral changes having discriminatory effect or purpose, the City argued
that, correctly interpreted, the VRA required more than a showing of discriminatory
effect alone; this claim was rejected. See id. at 172-73. Also, the City argued that the
VRA violated the principles of federalism. See id. at 179; infra notes 211-23 and
accompanying text. The City advanced two other arguments that were also rejected. See
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-82 (arguing that even if the VRA was an appropriate means
of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment when originally adopted, the subsequent extension
of the Act was unconstitutional); id. at 182-83 (arguing that the VRA violated
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previously held that a showing of discriminatory purpose was
required to establish a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and
that a showing of discriminatory effect alone was insufficient.0 6
Because the change proposed by the City was found not to have a
discriminatory purpose, the City argued that Congress was
preventing it from engaging in activity that was not
unconstitutional' and therefore Congress had exceeded its
enforcement power.208  The Supreme Court, relying on South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, rejected this argument, stating that
"Congress may, under the authority of §2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative
of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. ' 29 The Court
held that the provision was not unconstitutional.210
In City of Rome, the Court directly addressed a claim that the
VRA violated principles of federalismP The Court dismissed the
argument easily, reiterating its statement in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach that "'Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.' ",212 Further, the Court stated, "principles of federalism that
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.' Those Amendments were
constitutional rights of the City's citizens because it prevented the holding of elections).
206. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173. For this position, the City relied on City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), in which a plurality of the Court held that
purposeful discrimination must be shown to prove a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. See id. at 63; cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,247-48 (1976) (holding
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by a facially neutral statute
having disparate racial impact, in the absence of a showing of discriminatory purpose).
The City of Rome Court stated that "even if § 1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits
only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument
that Congress may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in
effect." City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173 (footnote omitted). Thus, "[f]or the purposes of
this case it is unnecessary to examine the various approaches expressed by the Members
of the Court in [Bolden]." Id. at 173 n.11.
207. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 176.
210. See id. at 158.
211. See id. at 178-80. The City asserted that "even if the Fifteenth Amendment
authorized Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act, that legislation violates principles of
federalism articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)." City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 178. National League of Cities was later overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
212- City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 178 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 324 (1966)).
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specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an
intrusion on state sovereignty. 1 3
Justice Powell and then-Justice Rehnquist both dissented in City
of Rome, voicing concerns for federalism.21 4 Foreshadowing the
approach taken in Flores, Justice Rehnquist focused on the meaning
of "enforce" as the critical means of distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible action on the part of Congress. 215 He
sketched out three theories of congressional powers under the
Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 16 First, Congress may prohibit conduct that would
213. Id. at 179.
214. See id. at 193-205 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 206-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell took issue with the Court's interpretation of the provision of the VRA
providing for bailout; he argued that the VRA allowed the City of Rome to bail out, even
if the State of Georgia continued to be covered. See id. at 196-200 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Justice Powell asserted that the majority's construction of the statute rendered
it unconstitutional as applied to the City of Rome. See id. at 200 (Powell, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Powell, the Court recognized in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that
the preclearance provisions implicated serious federalism concerns, but the Court
nonetheless upheld these prophylactic measures on the basis of evidence of actual voting
discrimination in the covered areas. See id. at 200-02 (Powell, J., dissenting). In Justice
Powell's view, federalism concerns were allayed by the purported accuracy of the
coverage formula, together with the bailout provisions, which would allow a state or
subdivision to exempt itself from the coverage formula when it was proved to be
nondiscriminating. See id. at 202-03 (Powell, J., dissenting). By withholding the bailout
option from the City of Rome, the majority allowed the City to be denied its local
autonomy because of the trespasses of other localities in the state; this was a violation of
federalism. See id. at 203-05 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 207 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In language that would be echoed in
Flores, Justice Rehnquist stated:
Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
Congress is granted only the power to "enforce" by "appropriate" legislation the
limitations on state action embodied in those Amendments. While the
presumption of constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the
Federal Government or of one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately
responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those entities.
Today's decision is nothing less than a total abdication of that authority, rather
than an exercise of the deference due to a coordinate branch of the government.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The Flores opinion centered on the
proper meaning of "enforce." See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-68; infra notes 278-92 and
accompanying text (discussing Flores and the meaning of "enforce"). Like Justice
Rehnquist, the Flores Court expressed respect for the acts of a coordinate branch of
government yet found that it is the responsibility of the courts to determine if Congress
has exceeded its power and to maintain the proper balance between the states and the
federal government. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172; infra notes 343-70 and accompanying
text (discussing Flores and the federal-state balance).
216. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 209-210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 and U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2). The Flores Court
divided congressional action into the permissible categories of remedial or preventive
legislation, and the impermissible category of substantive legislation. See Flores, 117 S.
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violate the Constitution.217 Regarding conduct that would not violate
the Constitution, as interpreted by the judiciary, Congress might act
under the second theory, which provides that Congress may act
remedially to enforce "judicially established substantive prohibitions
of the Amendments.2 18 Under the third theory, Congress has the
authority to determine for itself what the substantive provisions of
the Amendments entail and to prohibit any conduct that would
violate those provisions.219 According to Justice Rehnquist, only
action under the first two theories may properly be viewed as
"enforcement" of the Amendments; therefore only legislation based
on the first two theories is permissible. 20 To uphold legislation
passed under the third theory would give Congress the power to
interpret the Constitution, a power that has been reserved to the
judiciary and cannot be assumed by Congress without violating the
separation of powers doctrine." In Justice Rehnquist's view, the
application of the VRA at issue in City of Rome could be justified
only under the third theory;t 2 Congress had "effectively amend[ed]
Ct. at 2164; infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Flores Court's
analysis of congressional action).
217. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Within this "remedial" category of legislation,
Justice Rehnquist included congressional prohibition of conduct that might not itself
violate the Constitution, if either "that prohibition is necessary to remedy prior
constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or if necessary to effectively prevent
purposeful discrimination by a governmental unit." Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Thus, for example, he would include under this theory of congressional authority the
nationwide ban on literacy tests, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994), which was upheld by the
Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (plurality opinion). See City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 215-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The Court [in Oregon v. Mitchell]
found the nationwide ban to be an appropriate means of effectively preventing purposeful
discrimination in the application of the literacy tests as well as an appropriate means of
remedying prior constitutional violations by state and local governments in the
administration of education to minorities." Id at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 210-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222 See id. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist read City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 (1980), as holding that without purposeful discrimination there is
no violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 208 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Because the district court had found that the City of Rome did not
purposefully discriminate, see id. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), application of the
VRA to the City would amount to a prohibition by Congress of conduct on the part of the
City which the judiciary had ruled was constitutional, see id. at 210 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Consequently, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the result of the Court's
holding is that Congress effectively has the power to determine for itself that this conduct
violates the Constitution." Id. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This is in contrast to the
"remedial" sections of the VRA, such as the banning of literacy tests, with which
Congress prohibited conduct that was likely to be unconstitutional, without requiring
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the Constitution." -3
Although the Court recognized broad enforcement powers in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome, the Court's decision
in Katzenbach v. Morgan 4 potentially extended Congress's power
even further.2 Morgan, heard during the same term as South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, considered a section of the VRA2 6 providing
that a person who completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school
could not be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read,
write, understand, or interpret English.227 This provision conflicted
with New York State's election law, which required English literacy
as a condition of voting.' Registered voters from the State of New
York challenged the constitutionality of the provision. 2 9
The Morgan Court advanced two theories for upholding this
section of the VRA.23° First, the Court determined that Congress, by
ensuring that Puerto Rican Americans had access to the polls,
protected the Puerto Rican Americans' civil rights through their
voting rights."m ' According to this theory, Congress's action fell
actual proof of unconstitutionality. See id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
223. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If one begins with the
assumption that only the courts may properly interpret the Constitution, then enforcing
legislation that enacts a constitutional interpretation by Congress differing from that of
the courts would amount to an amendment of the Constitution. Thus, for example, in City
of Rome, the Court allowed Congress to change the meaning of the Constitution by
upholding legislation prohibiting conduct that the "real" Constitution allowed. See id. at
209-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Flores Court also developed this theme. See
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (stating that "if Congress could define its own powers by altering
the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning," then "[s]hifting legislative majorities could
change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V").
224. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
225. See Bickel, supra note 91, at 96-97 ("May [Congress] determine, not what means
are appropriate to the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ....
but the content of those Amendments ... ? These questions did not arise in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach .... But in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court did answer these
questions."); Cox, supra note 181, at 227 ("The potential scope of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach became apparent in Katzenbach v. Morgan."); Pawa, supra note 188, at 1060
(describing Morgan as "generally recognized as the Court's most deferential treatment of
congressional power under the Civil War Amendments").
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1994).
227. See id.; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643.
228. See Morgan, 384 U.S. 643-44 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§§ 150, 168 (Consol. 1950 & Supp. 1955) (abrogated by VRA)).
229. See id.
230. See Bickel, supra note 91, at 95-101; Cox, supra note 181, at 227-31.
231. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53; see also Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional
Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 70 (1986)
(stating that, under this theory, the challenged provision of the VRA was not essentially
different from those upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach). But see Bickel, supra note
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within its remedial power under the broad construction of that power
described in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.232  Second, and
alternatively, the Court stated that the VRA provision in question
was "legislation aimed at the elimination of an invidious
discrimination in establishing voter qualifications."'13  This
characterization of the VRA supports a theory that Congress has
some substantive power; that is, Congress has the authority to
determine for itself what constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Morgan was a significant case because of its potential
implications for the nature of congressional power, as suggested by
this second theory."5  In particular, the "substantive" or
91, at 98-101 (criticizing this rationale as an interpretational stretch and only superficially
attractive).
232. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (allowing Congress wide latitude in choosing the best
means to protect the civil rights of the Puerto Rican minority). The theory is explained as
follows: Congress may have been concerned with discrimination against the Puerto Rican
community by New York public agencies; instead of attacking such discrimination
directly, Congress chose instead to secure the vote to the Puerto Rican community,
thereby enabling the community to enqure non-discrimination for itself. See Bickel, supra
note 91, at 98-100; Brest, supra note 231, at 70.
233. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-54.
234. See Burt, supra note 94, at 81 ("In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Supreme Court
proclaimed that Congress had independent authority, to which courts would defer, to
interpret the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." (footnote omitted));
Cox, supra note 181, at 228 ("The net effect was that Congress effectively determined
that a State law violated the fourteenth amendment and set it aside even though the
Supreme Court-so often billed as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution-would
have sustained the same State law.").
235. See Burt, supra note 94, at 81 (observing that Congress viewed the Morgan
decision as an invitation to interpret for itself the substance of equal protection when it
passes legislation); Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions
of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299, 303-07
(1982) (posing hypothetical actions that Congress might take under a broad interpretation
of Morgan's alternative holding).
In Morgan, Justice Harlan expressed concern in his dissent that the majority's finding
of a substantive power in Congress might result in Congress having the power to restrict
rights:
In effect the Court reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress
the power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment. If that indeed be
the true reach of § 5, then I do not see why Congress should not be able as well
to exercise its § 5 "discretion" by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal
protection and due process decisions of this Court.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Responding in a footnote, the majority
stated:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, § 5 does not grant Congress power to
exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to
dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court." We emphasize
that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
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"definitional" theory raised questions regarding how much latitude
Congress had in its authority to interpret the Constitution.36
Because the theory was an alternative holding, it did not have
precedential force; the Court has neither relied on it in a subsequent
case nor repudiated it.P7  Thus, the significance of this alternate
theory has been open to question until Flores.38
guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.
Id. at 651 n.10 (quoting id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted). This
response by the Court, asserting that Congress may act to expand, but not to contract,
Fourteenth Amendment rights, has been called the "ratchet" theory. See William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv.
603, 606 (1975); Pawa, supra note 188, at 1062. Commentators have found the ratchet
theory troubling. See Brest, supra note 231, at 74-78 (discussing problems with arguments
justifying the ratchet theory); Burt, supra note 94, at 118-34 (illustrating the difficulty with
distinguishing the expansion and contraction of rights and questioning whether such a
distinction is desirable); Conkle, supra note 4, at 53-55 (arguing that even if Congress is
prevented from restricting constitutional rights, other sorts of congressional action may
interfere with the Court's function).
Commentators have wrestled with possible theories to justify such a substantive
power in Congress. See Cohen, supra, at 613-16 (distinguishing between congressional
judgment regarding "liberty" and "federalism" and arguing that the courts should enforce
limits on the former, but allow the political process to limit the latter); Cox, supra note
181, at 226-39 (justifying the power on the basis of Congress's superior fact-finding
ability); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 442-44 (defending Congress's role in assisting
the Court in implementing constitutional norms); see also Pawa, supra note 188, at 1062-
69 (summarizing three defenses of the power that have appeared in academic literature).
236. Compare, e.g., Burt, supra note 94, at 81-84, 133-34 (characterizing Morgan as a
bold opinion, and cautioning that its rhetoric threatened to remove an important restraint
on congressional action), and Laycock, supra note 97, at 165 ("The word 'remedial'
suggests that Congress must accept the Supreme Court's definition of a [constitutional]
violation, but that Congress can provide additional remedies for such violations. But it is
settled that these additional 'remedies' can consist of redefining the substantive
violation."), with Cox, supra note 181, at 234 ("Nothing in Morgan suggested that the
Court should defer to Congress in the process of deriving the applicable legal standard
from the [Constitution] or other sources of law; the opinion seemed to require Congress
to apply the same standard as the Court, merely leaving it free to apply the standard
differently where the application turned on 'questions of fact.' ").
237. See Conkle, supra note 4, at 52; see also Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at
131 (observing that the alternative theory of Morgan has never been expressly adopted by
the Court); Lee, supra note 140, at 94 (same). The Court had the opportunity to embrace
the ratchet theory in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (plurality opinion)
(unanimously upholding a VRA amendment effecting a nationwide ban on literacy tests,
upholding by a vote of 5 to 4 a provision that lowered the voting age for federal elections,
and striking by a vote of 5 to 4 a provision lowering the voting age in state elections). See
Cox, supra note 181, at 230-32; Pawa, supra note 188, at 1072-74. But "[a] bare majority
held, upon diverse and inconsistent grounds, that none of the three provisions could be
sustained under the fourteenth amendment." Cox, supra note 181, at 231-32; see also id.
at 232 (observing that the "contrariety of opinion [in Mitchell] throws into confusion the
status of the [substantive] branch of Morgan").
238. Compare Laycock, supra note 97, at 154-55 (arguing RFRA's constitutionality on
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Thirty years later, when the Court was confronted with the
challenge to RFRA in Flores, the nature of Congress's enforcement
powers was unclear. In Flores, influenced both by concerns of
federalism and separation of powers, the Court clarified the
parameters of this congressional power.39 Despite strong arguments
made by RFRA's opponents,2' the Court did not explicitly hold that
RFRA violated the separation of powers, but rather, the Court held
that Congress had exceeded the limits of its authority.24'
The separation of powers concerns expressed by RFRA's
opponents were elicited by comments made by members of Congress
and the President, all of whom were explicit that the Act was
intended to replace the Supreme Court's free exercise standard
announced in Smith 11 with the more protective standard that existed
prior to Smith 11. The Act itself had as its stated purpose "to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder."'24 More blatantly, members of Congress had
characterized the Act as overturning Smith 11.243 Moreover, when he
signed the bill into law, President Clinton announced that RFRA
reverses the Supreme Court's decision Employment
Division against Smith, and reestablishes a standard that
better protects all Americans of all faiths in the exercise of
the basis of the substantive power derived from Morgan), with Gressman & Carmella,
supra note 140, at 131-33 (arguing that Morgan establishes nothing more than a remedial
power in Congress).
239. The federalism concerns appear to dominate. See infra notes 333-42 and
accompanying text.
240. See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 119-40; see also Conkle, supra note
4, at 66-68, 71-78 (stating that RFRA is an attempt to mandate a standard of review that
the Supreme Court intentionally rejected and thus is a challenge to the basic principle of
separation of powers); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 445, 469-73 (arguing that
Congress overreached its role and compromised the integrity of the judicial process by
enacting RFRA); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 171, 173-74 (1995) (stating that RFRA "is a
challenge to the concept of judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution");
Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 307-14 (describing RFRA not as instructing the Supreme
Court on how to interpret the Free Exercise Clause, but as directing the Court to give any
party's Free Exercise claim the "legal effect appropriate in Congress' view"). The
arguments advanced by these commentators for finding RFRA to be an unconstitutional
violation of the separation of powers are discussed in more detail below. See infra notes
245-55 and accompanying text.
241. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160; infra notes 264-92 and accompanying text
(discussing the limits on congressional authority imposed by the Court).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994) (citations omitted).
243. See S. REP. No. 103-11, 6-9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898-99;
H.R. REP. No. 103-88, 4-7 (1993); Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 66-67
(describing the President's appraisal of RFRA and congressional sentiments expressed
during the development of RFRA).
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their religion in a way that I am convinced is far more
consistent with the intent of the Founders of this Nation
than the Supreme Court decision.' 4
The arguments advanced by RFRA's critics that RFRA violated
the separation of powers can be categorized into two basic types.245
The first type of argument-the Klein argument-was based on the
allegation that RFRA commanded the judiciary to "prescribe a rule
for the decision of a cause in a particular way.""24 By dictating to the
courts the standard to be used in judging free exercise claims, RFRA
attempted to control the legal effect given to those claims;247 that is,
Congress attempted to substitute its own judgment of the proper
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause for that of the Supreme
Court, as expressed in Smith I124  In this way, Congress has
encroached on the role of the judiciary.?9 This interference by the
legislative branch in an area properly belonging to the judicial branch
was thought to constitute a violation of the separation of powers.'
244. President's Remarks, supra note 6, at 2000.
245. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 612-25 (analyzing the separation of powers
arguments made by RFRA's critics).
246. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872) (voiding a congressional
statute that dictated to the courts what constituted a presidential pardon).
247. See Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 309.
248. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 470; see also Gressman & Carmella, supra
note 140, at 124 ("Congress, by enacting RFRA, believes that it can better and more
properly interpret the Constitution than the Supreme Court. And Congress mandates this
better interpretation by requiring the use of a judicial standard of review that has no
independent statutory source."); Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 311 ("It does not put too
fine a point on the matter to say that the RFRA is meant to make the lack of a
meritorious First Amendment claim (an 'unmeritorious' claim, in the Supreme Court's
view) utterly irrelevant.").
249. RFRA is a "conscription of the Court by Congress to play a role in a charade-a
charade in which the Court is obliged to act as though its own judgment about a matter of
consequence is different than it actually is." Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 471; see
also Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 121 ("RFRA [was] a congressional arrow
aimed directly at the heart of the independent judicial function of constitutional
interpretation.").
250. The emphasis in this theory is on the interference of the legislative branch with
the work of the judicial branch. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (1996)
("Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself ... the separation-of-powers
doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional
duties."). The Smith II Court rejected the balancing test in part because of institutional
concerns. Balancing the relative importance of a religious claim against a governmental
interest was an activity best left to politically accountable legislatures, rather than an
unelected judiciary. See Berg, supra note 3, at 8-9. With RFRA, Congress thrust back on
the judiciary an activity that the Court determined was best carried out elsewhere. See
Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith fl), 494 U.S. 872,888-90 (1990).
This argument that RFRA is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of
powers under Klein has been advanced by several critics of RFRA. See Eisgruber &
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The second argument that RFRA violated the separation of
powers-related to the first, but with a slightly different emphasis-
derives from the principle enunciated in Marbury v. Madison"' that
"[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." 2 This argument-the Marbury argument-is
predicated on the view that Marbury stands for the proposition that
the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.213 RFRA
was an embodiment of Congress's vision of the First Amendment,
and in this sense was an act of constitutional interpretation on the
part of Congress.5 4 Congress could not constitutionally override the
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, as it had attempted
to do with RFRA.2 5
Sager, supra note 6, at 470-72; Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 134-37; Van
Alstyne, supra note 145, at 307-12. But see Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 616-24
(distinguishing RFRA from the statute voided in Klein on the grounds that RFRA did not
dictate a result, just a standard of review, leaving the courts free to interpret RFRA in
particular cases).
251. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
252. Id. at 177.
253. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (calling the supremacy of the Court to
interpret the Constitution "a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system"); Gressman & Carmella, supra note 140, at 120-21; Lupu, supra note 240, at 173-
74. But see Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 625-79 (arguing that this interpretation of
Marbury is incorrect, because it is not supported by history, nor by any statement in the
case itself; there are practical reasons for allowing Congress some interpretive authority;
and there is case law in which congressional interpretation has been allowed without
raising separation of powers issues).
254. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 635 ("[T]here is simply no getting around
the fact that in the course of debating and enacting RFRA, Congress interpreted some
aspect of the Constitution (the Free Exercise Clause and/or the Fourteenth
Amendment).").
255. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 441 ("RFRA is, after all, precisely what it
announces itself to be, and what its supporters praised it as being: a congressional
attempt to overturn the Supreme Court's judgment in Smith [II]."); Lupu, supra note 240,
at 173-74 ("[The entire concept of RFRA is a challenge to the concept of judicial
supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution .... [T]he idea that Congress may
replace the Court's view with its own concerning the general rules governing our
constitutional arrangements is heretical."); Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 296
("Congress has claimed no less than an authority to review the Supreme Court for
constitutional error.").
The district court in Flores embraced this argument. See Flores v. City of Boerne,
877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997); supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing the district court
opinion); see also Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting) ("It hardly needs to be said that where Congress and the Supreme Court are
so clearly at odds with each other over the definition of a fundamental right, the conflict
presents an obvious and serious threat to the delicate balance of the separation of
powers.").
Other courts have disagreed. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir.
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The City of Boerne considered separation of powers to be of
primary importance, presenting it as the major issue in its brief to the
Court. 6 Characterizing RFRA as "an undisguised attempt by
1996) ("We defer to the Fifth Circuit's analysis of why the Act does not violate the
separation of powers ... ."); Abordo v. Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (D. Haw. 1995)
(rejecting the argument that RFRA violated the separation of powers); Belgard v. State
of Hawai'i, 883 F. Supp. 510,513-16 (D. Haw. 1995) (same).
The emphasis here is on the idea that Congress performed an act-constitutional
interpretation-that it was not constitutionally empowered to perform. The strictest
version of this view maintains that Congress should not engage in any constitutional
interpretation whatsoever. See Brest, supra note 231, at 61. Those who believe that
Congress may engage in some interpretive activity may be placed into one of two
categories: "[T]hose who acquiesce in judicial supremacy and those who assert legislative
independence in constitutional interpretation." Id. at 62. Thus, there are those who
maintain that Congress should be given some latitude to make constitutional
interpretations, but that Congress must defer to the Court when the two bodies differ in
their judgments. See id. at 62-65; Conkle, supra note 4, at 53; Eisgruber & Sager, supra
note 6, at 442-43. Included in this group are proponents of the idea that Congress may
engage in constitutional interpretation in partnership with the Court to enforce
constitutional norms. See Conkle, supra note 4, at 53-54; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6,
at 442-43; see also supra note 68 (summarizing the idea behind the foundational statute).
Critics of RFRA who espouse this view of congressional interpretive power maintained
that RFRA subverted, rather than supplemented, the Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment. See Conkle, supra note 4, at 66-68; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 443-
44.
At the other extreme are those who assert that Congress has independent authority
to interpret the Constitution, even if the Supreme Court has already pronounced a
contrary interpretation. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 624-79 (arguing that RFRA
does not violate Marbury, because Marbury does not preclude constitutional
interpretation by Congress, even after the Supreme Court has spoken). Professor Robin-
Vergeer has challenged the view that allows Congress to interpret the Constitution as
long as it does not contradict the Supreme Court's prior interpretation: To rest a
determination of RFRA's unconstitutionality on the fact that the Court spoke first (Smith
II preceded RFRA) turns the issue of RFRA's constitutionality into "a race to decision
between the Supreme Court and Congress, trivializing the roles of each." Id. at 624-25.
256. See Brief for Petitioner at 13-15, Flores (No. 95-2074). The first question
presented by the petitioner, City of Boerne, was "[w]hether Congress violated the
separation of powers doctrine by legislatively overruling a Supreme Court determination
of the scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at i. The City's
separation of powers arguments were based on the writings discussed supra in notes 245-
55 and accompanying text. See Brief for Petitioner at 12-19, Flores (No. 95-2074).
At the time, perhaps, federalism arguments did not appear to be the strongest ones
to make. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 460 ("We might excuse thoughtful
observers for believing that (at least as a matter of Supreme Court doctrine) federalism
concerns no longer impose any independent constraint upon congressional action.");
Lupu, supra note 240, at 215 (observing that the Court has only recently become more
interested in federalism). The City of Boerne did argue that RFRA violated principles of
federalism, but this was the City's second argument, after the separation of powers
argument. See Brief for Petitioner at 42-46, Flores (No. 95-2074).
Because the VRA cases had so broadly defined Congress's authority under the
Enforcement Clauses, opponents of RFRA attempted to distinguish Flores on the
grounds that the separation of powers affront was more sharply delineated. With RFRA,
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Congress to overtake [the Supreme] Court's core constitutional
function and to reverse [the] Court's statement of the meaning of the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause in Smith [I],"1 the City
asserted that "[t]o restore the balance of power between Congress
and the Court intended by the Framers to ensure liberty, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act must be struck down.""8  The
City alleged that the argument made by Archbishop Flores and the
United States-that RFRA enforced the Equal Protection Clause-
was a pretext to hide RFRA's "true nature": "a Congressional
attempt to define the substantive scope of the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause."5 9
If the Supreme Court had found that RFRA violated the
separation of powers doctrine, then it could have stricken RFRA on
that ground, as the district court had done,260 without regard for
whether RFRA was being applied to federal or state law.261 Instead,
the Court addressed only RFRA's application to state law and
analyzed the scope of Congress's enforcement powers.262 The Court
Congress expressly sought to substitute its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause for
that already pronounced by the Court. With the VRA, the separation of powers issues
involved the power of Congress to prohibit the use of literacy tests and to prohibit states
and political subdivisions from enacting changes in voting procedures that would have
discriminatory effect, even if there was no discriminatory purpose. See supra notes 180-
223 and accompanying text (discussing the VRA cases). RFRA went further by not only
enacting a constitutional interpretation differing from the Court's, but mandating to the
courts how they should resolve free exercise claims; thus, unlike the VRA, RFRA raised
separation of powers issues of both Marbury and Klein types. See supra notes 245-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the separation of powers arguments).
257. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Flores (No. 95-2074).
258. IL at 25-26.
259. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 10, Flores (No. 95-2074).
260. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
261. The City's argument that RFRA violated the separation of powers appears to
apply with equal force regardless of whether RFRA was applied to a federal law or a
state law. Either Congress had intruded on the role of th6 judiciary, or it had not; that
determination was not dependent on whose law was the object of Congress's action. See
Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 677-78 (observing that the majority of RFRA's critics do
not claim that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to federal law, and that this
concession is fatal to their challenge).
262. Although the Court considered RFRA only as it applied to state law, it appears to
have struck down RFRA in its entirety, without distinguishing its application to federal
laws. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172. The only indication the Court gave-other than
quoting the operative sections in the statute-that RFRA applied to federal laws as well
as to state laws, was the statement that "Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA's
provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States." Id. at 2162. Nevertheless,
the Court did question the City's advocate at oral arguments about the separation Of
powers argument as it applied to both state and federal law. See United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript, Flores (No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL 87109, at *17.
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concluded that RFRA was beyond the limits of those powers and this
conclusion appears to be based upon federalism and separation of
powers concerns.263
Both separation of powers and federalism potentially limit the
scope of Congress's enforcement powers.2 4 The potential limit
imposed by separation of powers is determined by the line
demarcating the extent of Congress's interpretive authority.265 If § 5
The issue of RFRA's constitutionality as applied to federal law is discussed in the
academic literature. See Laycock, supra note 97, at 155-56 (arguing that, in addition to
being constitutional as applied to the states, RFRA was also constitutional as applied to
federal law); Lupu, supra note 240, at 213 (arguing that, although RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to the states, it was constitutional as applied to federal law);
Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 294 & n.12 (same). Some commentators questioned
whether there was any enumerated power under which Congress had authority to pass
RFRA, as applied to federal laws. See Hamilton, supra note 178, at 361-70 (arguing that
the First Amendment is a limitation on Congress, not an enumerated power, and
therefore Congress has no authority to regulate with respect to free exercise rights).
Professors Lupu and Van Alstyne argued that RFRA is constitutional as applied to
federal law because whatever enumerated power authorizes Congress to enact a law in
the first place would also allow Congress to accommodate religion by making a religious
exemption. See Lupu, supra note 240, at 213; Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 294 & n.12.
Neither directly addressed the issue of whether RFRA violated the separation of powers
of the Klein type. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text (discussing this
separation of powers argument). According to Professor Van Alstyne, "to the extent that
the RFRA itself merely prescribes a rule of construction regarding the manner in which
other acts of Congress are to be applied, it is unremarkable." Van Alstyne, supra note 145,
at 294 n.12.
263. The concerns for federalism are predominant. See infra notes 333-42 and
accompanying text.
264. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1361 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 691 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 444-45
(arguing that Congress exceeded its authority when it enacted RFRA, violating both
separation of powers and federalism); Lupu, supra note 240, at 173 ("Seen through the
prisms of federalism and power separation,... RFRA is both unprecedented and
distinctively problematic.").
265. Prior to Flores, especially in light of the Morgan decision, see supra notes 224-38
and accompanying text (discussing the Morgan opinion), there was speculation regarding
what, if any, limit existed. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (discussing
confusion surrounding the issue of the extent of Congress's substantive power).
After Flores, it is clear that Congress's enforcement power is limited, but whether
separation of powers is violated by exceeding that limit is not clear. See infra notes 333-
40 and accompanying text (discussing this point). With Flores, the Court has set a limit on
Congress's interpretive authority; this limit is determined by the line dividing remedial
legislation from substantive legislation. See infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's test). The Flores Court, although it discussed the importance of
distinguishing between Congress's enforcement of the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Congress's substantive interpretation of those provisions, never stated
that substantive interpretation would intrude on the role of the judiciary. See Flores, 117
S. Ct. at 2164; see also infra notes 333-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
focus in its analysis of the harms resulting from an enactment exceeding Congress's
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the power to
enforce the substantive provisions of § 1 of that Amendment,266 does
not give Congress the power to interpret those substantive
provisions, then Congress exceeds the limits of its authority when it
violates the separation of powers as set forth in Marbury.267 When
this issue was raised in the VRA cases,268 the Court responded by
recognizing Congress's prophylactic power,269 and even suggesting, in
the Morgan decision, that Congress has the authority to interpret the
Constitution for itself.270
Federalism also potentially limits Congress's exercise of its
enforcement powers. A basic principle of federalism is that Congress
may not interfere with the autonomy of the states, except insofar as it
acts pursuant to an enumerated power.271 In the case of RFRA and
authority).
266. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. An analogous statement holds for sections 1 and 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment. See supra note 178.
267. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (discussing the separation of
powers argument of the second type, based on Marbury). This is the conclusion reached
by the majority in Flores, based on the history of enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text; see also Bickel, supra note
91, at 97-98 ("[T]he general premise of Marbury v. Madison, and of M'Culloch v.
Maryland also, is that Congress does not define the limits of its own powers. It belongs,
rather, to the Court, exercising its function of judicial review, to do so.").
268. See supra notes 180-238 and accompanying text (discussing challenges raised in
the VRA cases).
269. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text (discussing the VRA cases and the
prophylactic power).
270. See supra notes 224-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Morgan case).
Only Justice Harlan, writing in dissent in Morgan, was troubled by the infringement on
the rule of Marbury. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("I believe the Court has confused the issue of how much enforcement power
Congress possesses under § 5 with the distinct issue of what questions are appropriate for
congressional determination and what questions are essentially judicial in nature."); see
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970) (plurality opinion) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("To allow a simple majority of Congress to
have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is ... fundamentally out of
keeping with the constitutional structure."). Commentators raised the issue as well. See
Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hil" Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695, 713-14 (1996)
("In light of the famous statement in Marbury v. Madison that '[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,' any complete judicial
deference to congressional constitutional interpretation would seem insupportable."
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))); Pawa, supra note 188,
at 1061 ("For the court to pay such deference to congressional determinations might be
seen as endangering the fundamental constitutional principle of Marbury v. Madison that
the judiciary has the last word in interpreting the Constitution." (citation omitted)).
271. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."); Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James
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the VRA, that enumerated power is Congress's power pursuant to
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment272 to enforce the substantive
provisions of that Amendment. If Congress relies on its § 5 authority
to enforce something other than a substantive provision of § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, then it violates the principle of
federalism.27 3 The federalism arguments advanced in the VRA cases
were dismissed by the majority with little comment. 74
The case law prior to Flores suggested that neither separation of
powers concerns nor federalism concerns placed substantial limits on
Congress's enforcement power? 5  The Flores Court took the
opportunity to revisit the federalism concerns raised by the dissenters
Madison)); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883) (discussing § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a source of power to the federal government); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1879) (discussing the allotment of powers between the federal government and
the states effected by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Brest, supra note 231, at 58-
59 (discussing the possible enumerated powers pursuant to which Congress might act
when considering legislation such as RFRA); Van Alstyne, supra note 145, at 299 ("The
Tenth Amendment merely made explicit what was otherwise understood by the doctrine
of enumerated powers-that Congress may make laws overriding state laws, but it may do
so only to the extent it is granted express authority to do so, and not beyond.").
272. Or, in some of the VRA cases, § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See supra note
178 (noting that the Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
have been similarly construed).
273. Congress might enforce something other than the substantive provisions of the
Amendment by, for example, prohibiting conduct that was clearly constitutional. This
was then-Justice Rehnquist's concern in his City of Rome dissent. See City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 221 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
wrote that by allowing the federal government to block the City of Rome's
implementation of voting procedures that had been judicially determined to be
constitutional, the Court had abdicated its responsibility to determine whether Congress
had acted within its authority. See id. at 207 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As a result,
Congress was allowed more power vis-A-vis the states than was envisioned by the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("To permit
congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged in this case requires state and
local governments to cede far more of their powers to the Federal Government than the
Civil War Amendments ever envisioned."). Justice Powell expressed similar concerns.
See icL at 200-05 (Powell, J., dissenting); supra note 214 (discussing Justice Powell's City
of Rome dissent); see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 465-66 (describing the harm
to the states of the "federalization" created by RFRA).
274. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (discussing federalism challenges
raised in the VRA cases).
275. The Flores Court cited Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (plurality
opinion), as an illustration of the fact that congressional power is limited. See Flores, 117
S. Ct. at 2167. "But the contrariety of views of the Justices in the majority on that issue
makes it impossible to say just what limitation has been placed on the rationale that
Congress' enforcement power in section 5 of the 14th amendment includes the power to
give substantive content to the meaning of due process and equal protection." Cohen,
supra note 235, at 610.
1998] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
in the VRA cases.76 Although the Court hinted at separation of
powers problems with RFRA, the opinion in Flores suggests that the
Court viewed RFRA as posing at least as great a threat to federalism.
Indeed, the Court appeared to be more concerned with the balance
of power between the federal government and the states than with
the balance of power between Congress and the courts.
277
The Court set a limit on Congress's § 5 power, and it appears
that the limits imposed by federalism and the separation of powers
are not distinct: The limit imposed by federalism is coextensive with
the limit of congressional authority. The limit of congressional
authority, according to the Flores Court, is the line dividing the
remedial from the substantive,278 that is, the limit imposed by the
Marbury separation of powers argument.279 The Court determined
this limit, and the test for determining whether Congress exceeded it,
by divining the meaning of the word "enforce." 0
The Court described Congress's enforcement power as though
viewed on a spectrum, ranging from clearly constitutional to clearly
unconstitutional uses of that power?' Purely remedial legislation
rests at the clearly constitutional end. Legislation creating
substantive rights rests at the clearly unconstitutional end. 3 The
276. See supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text (discussing the VRA dissents).
277. Nevertheless, the opinion has ramifications for the power balance of both types.
See infra notes 343-70 and accompanying text.
278. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
279. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (discussing this argument).
280. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
281. See id. (describing Congress's power under § 5).
282. For example, Congress may create criminal and civil penalties for violations of
the provisions of the Civil War Amendments, as these provisions have been interpreted
by the Supreme Court. See Conkle, supra note 4, at 42.
283. As discussed above, see supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text, prior to Flores
it was not clear what constituted an example of such an unconstitutional use of Congress's
enforcement powers. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court had
suggested that Congress might constitutionally use its enforcement power in a way that
created additional rights under the Equal Protection Clause. See supra notes 233-38 and
accompanying text (discussing the substantive theory of Morgan). But then, in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (plurality opinion), the Court struck down, as beyond the
scope of Congress's § 5 authority, a provision of the VRA that would have lowered the
voting age to 18 as applied to the states. See id. at 118 (Black, J.). Because Mitchell was a
splintered opinion (in addition to the judgment there were four other concurring or
dissenting opinions), it was difficult to draw any precise conclusions regarding the Court's
willingness to grant Congress substantive power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Choper, supra note 235, at 314 (characterizing Mitchell as "[t]he Justices' most
thorough if not most informative consideration of the scope of Morgan's definitional
branch to date"); Cohen, supra note 235, at 610 ("[T]he contrariety of views of the
Justices in the majority... makes it impossible to say just what limitation has been placed
on the rationale that Congress' enforcement power in section 5 of the 14th amendment
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middle gray area surrounding the line dividing constitutional from
unconstitutional legislation contains the prophylactic, or preventive,
power of Congress.'
Acknowledging that a line between remedial and substantive
legislation is difficult to draw and that Congress should have "wide
latitude in determining where it lies," the Court stated that "[t]here
must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 5 This
new proportionality test is essentially a balancing test. The end of
the legislation will be the protection against some constitutional
violation, either under the Fourteenth Amendment itself, or under an
incorporated right.25 The means Congress has chosen to obtain that
end will presumably have some adverse impact on the states;
otherwise the means would not be subject to challenge. The Court
weighs the infringement on state authority against the threat of a
constitutional violation envisioned in the legislation's end. 2 7  The
factors that go into this balancing include the legislative record
compiled by Congress,28  and whether the legislation "has
termination dates, geographic restrictions, or 'egregious
includes the power to give substantive content to the meaning of due process and equal
protection."); Cox, supra note 181, at 232 ("The contrariety of opinion throws into
confusion the status of the second branch of Morgan and the principle of judicial
deference to congressional determinations of fact and degree.").
After Flores, the Court is not likely to allow the substantive theory suggested in
Morgan. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (disaffirming the substantive theory of Morgan).
Thus, this alternative theory of Morgan, see supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text
(describing Morgan's substantive theory), provides an example of an unconstitutional use
of Congress's enforcement powers.
284. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 463
(characterizing the prophylactic power as the power to make legislation that "reach[es]
further than the Court itself could or would reach"); Laycock, supra note 97, at 153
(characterizing the prophylactic power as action by Congress that improves enforcement
of a constitutional provision as the Supreme Court interprets it).
285. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. The Court also stated that "[w]hile preventive rules are
sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the
means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must
be considered in light of the evil presented." Id. at 2169.
286. That the test also applies to enforcement legislation under the Fifteenth
Amendment can be inferred from the Court's comparison of RFRA to the VRA. See id.
at 2169-71; supra note 178 (observing that the Enforcement Clauses are construed
similarly). In the case of the VRA, Congress sought to protect voting rights under the
Fifteenth Amendment and civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes
180-238 and accompanying text (discussing the VRA cases). In the case of RFRA,
Congress sought to protect First Amendment rights. See supra notes 25-33 and
accompanying text (describing Congress's purpose for enacting RFRA).
287. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169-71.
288. See id. at 2169-70.
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predicates.' "' The legislative record provides evidence regarding
the nature and magnitude of the threat;2 90 factors such as termination
dates and geographic restrictions help to circumscribe the reach and
scope of the legislation, thereby limiting the burden on the states;291
and all the factors, including the existence of "egregious predicates,"
help to justify the imposition of that burden. The Court stated that
such factors are not required, but "limitations of this kind tend to
ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under§ 5. ''292
The Court illustrated the use of its test by comparing the VRA
and RFRA.293 When Congress enacted the VRA, it had extensive
legislative findings indicating pervasive and ongoing discrimination in
the context of voting.294  By contrast, the legislative record
confronting Congress when it enacted RFRA "lack[ed] examples of
modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry."2 95 The Court hastened to point out, however, that
the record itself is not exceedingly important; the Court will defer to
Congress regardless of whether there is a record, or how
comprehensive it is, provided that Congress acts within its proper
authority.296 The legislative record provides information regarding
what Congress was trying to accomplish, thereby allowing the Court
to determine if Congress was acting within its authority.297 The
289. Id. at 2170.
290. See id. at 2169 (finding no evidence of widespread religious discrimination in the
RFRA record, in contrast to the VRA record, which was replete with examples of voting
discrimination).
291. See id. at 2170-71 (describing the broad reach and scope of RFRA and its effect
on the states, in contrast to the more circumscribed and therefore less intrusive reach and
scope of the VRA).
292. Id.
293. See id. at 2169-71.
294. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308-15 (1966).
295. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. But see Laycock, supra note 97, at 166 ("Many facially
neutral, generally applicable laws are in fact based on hostility to a particular religion or
to religion in general.... Congress found ... that neutral laws have been used to suppress
religion,.., and that therefore we need RFRA." (footnotes omitted)).
296. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169-70.
297. See id. The Court stated that "[j]udicial deference.., is based not on the state of
the legislative record Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision of the body
constitutionally appointed to decide .... ' As a general matter, it is for Congress to
determine the method by which it will reach a decision." Id. at 2170 (quoting Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (plurality opinion) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). But the lack of examples in the record of laws passed because of
intentional religious discrimination supported the Court's conclusion that RFRA was out
of proportion to any remedial or preventive objective. See id. Because RFRA was out of
proportion to any remedial or preventive object, it was beyond Congress's authority, and
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record before Congress when considering the VRA compiled
trespasses of the states on the voting rights of African-Americans and
thus highlighted previous violations of the Constitution and strongly
suggested a threat of continued violations 9.2 8  The record before
Congress when considering RFRA, however, highlighted "the
incidental burdens imposed, not the object or purpose of the
[suspect] legislation." '299 That is, the RFRA record contained no
persuasive evidence of an ongoing or continued threat of future
violations of constitutional rights,300 at least as those rights had been
articulated in Smith IL.3 1 Thus, while the end of the VRA was clearly
the protection of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights, the
end of RFRA was not so compellingly tied to the prevention of
violations of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
The means employed by Congress in the VRA to combat the
evils of voting discrimination included the banning of literacy tests
and a requirement of preclearance of any changes in voting
procedures .3  The VRA provided that preclearance would be denied
if a discriminatory effect alone was shown, despite the fact that the
Court had held that proof of discriminatory intent is required to show
a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.30 3 The resulting burden to
the states was the interference with their ability to determine freely
their own voting procedures.3 04n That burden would be relieved when
the states complied with the bailout provisions of the VRA, thereby
showing themselves to be free of discriminatory practices. 0
Moreover, the preclearance provision applied only to the "covered"
regions.305 Thus, the means employed in the VRA were tailored to
the evils that they were designed to combat, as well as being limited
in scope and time.3°
therefore was not entitled to judicial deference. See id. at 2171-72.
298. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15.
299. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. But see Laycock, supra note 97, at 167 (arguing that
Congress did have evidence of bad motive).
300. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169 (describing the RFRA record).
301. See supra notes 144-60 and accompanying text (summarizing Smith I and Smith
I).
302. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-16.
303. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980); supra notes 197-213
and accompanying text (discussing the preclearance provisions of the VRA and their
prophylactic nature).
304. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323.
305. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1994); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 167 (describing the
"bailout" provision).
306. See supra note 183 (defining the "covered" regions).
307. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
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By contrast, the means Congress employed in RFRA to protect
free exercise rights consisted of the requirement that a balancing test
be applied to state laws that substantially burden an individual's
religious exercise.308 RFRA was not directed to any specific class of
laws.30 9 Because a claim that a law places a substantial burden on a
religious practice can be hard to contest, the Court foresaw the states
often being forced to justify their laws with a compelling interest;
many laws could not meet such a demanding standard. 310 A religious
exemption would be required for every law that could not meet the
compelling interest test.31 ' In theory, any state or local law was
vulnerable to the creation of such religious exemptions. 2 The means
adopted by Congress, then, painted in the worst light, could result in
exemptions to many laws-laws involving any subject matter, not
necessarily ostensibly related to religion, and at any level of
government. 13 The Court therefore concluded that RFRA entailed a
heavy burden on the states.314
Balancing the burden on the states against the threat of
constitutional violations, the Court found the VRA and RFRA
clearly distinguishable. 31 5 The burden imposed on the states by the
VRA was related to voting procedures; the evidence before Congress
pointed to almost a century of voting discrimination.3 16  The VRA
was remedial legislation,317 and the burden was confined both in
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
309. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. Unlike the VRA, which affected only state voting
laws, RFRA "applies to all federal and state law, statutory or otherwise, whether adopted
before or after its enactment." Id.
310. See id. at 2171. To contest a claim that an individual's free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened would necessarily involve a discussion of what is central to that
individual's religion. See icL; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-87 (1990)
(Smith I1). The Court in Smith H asked, "[w]hat principle of law or logic can be brought
to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal
faith?" Smith I, 494 U.S. at 887. Because "courts must not presume to determine the
place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim," id., most
laws challenged under RFRA would be judged under the compelling interest standard,
"the most demanding test known to constitutional law," Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171; see
Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 887-88.
311. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171. Alternatively, RFRA might invalidate the law. See
id. at 2168-69, 2171.
312. See id. at 2171.
313. See i; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 464-65 (describing the
potential impact of RFRA on state and local laws).
314. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (characterizing RFRA's coverage as sweeping and
intrusive); i at 2171 (referring to the "substantial costs" that RFRA exacts).
315. See id. at 2169-71.
316. See id. at 2167.
317. See id. at 2166-67.
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geographic scope and in time.318 RFRA, on the other hand, was
limited in no such manner; it extended to every conceivable type of
law, regardless of whether specific laws related to religious
discrimination, and its reach was not limited in geography or in
time.319 The Court did not find the necessary justification in the form
of past documented evil, or future threatened evil, to justify such an
encroachment on state authority.320
Specifically with regard to prophylactic measures, the Court
observed that "[p]reventive measures prohibiting certain types of
laws may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of
the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional. 3' Thus, for example, before
passage of the VRA, a literacy test that was being applied in a
discriminatory manner would be barred, once intentional
discrimination was proved.3" After the VRA was enacted, all
literacy tests in covered areas were barred, perhaps even some that
were being applied in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner1 3 Given
the legislative history suggesting that, in the covered areas, tests were
being applied prevalently in a discriminatory manner, the Court
deferred to Congress's judgment that the predominant effect of the
VRA would be to eliminate the need for a case-by-case proof of
discrimination that existed in most cases.324
With RFRA, in contrast, Congress's decision to remove the need
to prove intentional religious discrimination3  effected a substantive
change in constitutional protections, because most of the laws that
would be affected by RFRA were enacted, more likely than not,
318. See id. at 2170.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 2170-71. "The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their
traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith [fl]." Id.
at 2171.
321. Id. at 2170.
322. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,53 (1959).
323. See supra note 196.
324. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
325. Under Smith II, a religious objector to a facially neutral law would have to prove
that the law was enacted in order to target religious beliefs and practices in order to
obtain relief. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520,522 (1993). The proponents of RFRA argued that RFRA removed the need to prove
the discriminatory motivation behind the neutral law, and functioned analogously to the
VRA. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168-69 (relying on arguments of Archbishop Flores and
the United States).
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without discriminatory intent.326  Under RFRA, many laws that
would be valid under Smith 11 would fall.327 These laws would fall,
not because they were passed with discriminatory intent, but because
Congress subjected them to the RFRA balancing test, which was not
constitutionally required.32 In this sense, RFRA created "extra
constitutional rights. 329
Ultimately, the Court concluded that, unlike the VRA, RFRA's
goal was not merely to remove the requirement of case-by-case proof
that a constitutional violation had occurred °.33  The Court concluded
that Congress's intent when it enacted RFRA was to enlarge the
substantive protections within the Free Exercise Clause, not just to
prevent the states from violating the free exercise protections that the
Court had already found there.331 Thus, Congress had overstepped its
power, because it had attempted to effect a substantive change in the
Constitution.3 32
RFRA's fault was that it strayed too far from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, with the result that
Congress crossed the line into substantive interpretation? 33
326. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171; Jonathan Kieffer, Comment, A Line in the Sand:
Difficulties in Discerning the Limits of Congressional Power as Illustrated by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 44 KAN. L. REV. 601, 628 (1996). But see Laycock, supra note
97, at 166-67 (arguing that many neutral laws are passed with discriminatory intent). The
Court specifically mentioned zoning regulations and historic preservation laws as
examples of neutral laws that have adverse effects on churches and synagogues, but are
not passed with any hostility towards religion. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. Moreover,
such laws burden a large class of individuals, and those burdened due to religious reasons
are no more burdened than others. See id. at 2171.
327. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
328. See id.; supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (describing the balancing test
required by RFRA); see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 171, at 244 ("RFRA
increases the likelihood of success for religious claims, because government will find it far
more difficult to justify restrictions on religious exercise under RFRA's compelling
interest test than under Smith [I]'s nondiscrimination standard.").
329. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Flores (No. 95-2074).
330. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171. As the VRA cases showed, such a goal would have
been within Congress's authority because it would be within its prophylactic power.
331. See id. ("Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws
likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion.... [RFRA] is broader
than is appropriate if the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.").
332. See id. at 2170-71; see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 171, at 219 ("The Act
is ... a statute designed to perform a constitutional function. It is designed to restore the
rights that ... Congress believes should exist if the Constitution were properly
interpreted."); id. at 244 ("RFRA is not a mere technical change from Smith [II]. Rather,
it restores a fundamentally different vision of human liberty.").
333. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 ("RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive
legislation .... It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections.").
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However, this does not necessarily mean that RFRA violated the
separation of powers in the "traditional" sense3m of one branch
interfering with the work of another.335 The Court did not focus on
the harm RFRA caused to the judiciary,336 nor did it seem to be
concerned with its own power or authority; rather, the Court focused
on the harm RFRA would do to the states.337 Thus, the Court did not
make clear whether RFRA actually violated the separation of
powers, but it can at least be inferred that striking RFRA was
"significant ... in maintaining the separation of powers. '338  On the
other hand, the Court noted repeatedly that when Congress oversteps
the limits of its power, it intrudes upon state sovereignty,339 and
examined the dangers of Congress's intrusion into state matters.Y30
334. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 624 (referring to the Klein-based separation
of powers argument as the traditional separation of powers argument); supra notes 245-50
and accompanying text (describing this separation of powers argument).
335. If the Court had discussed RFRA's application to federal law, it might have
become clear whether RFRA violated the separation of powers, and in what sense.
Assuming Congress had some authority pursuant to which it could enact RFRA, then,
with regard to federal law, federalism would not be an issue and separation of powers
would have emerged as the only potential limit on this authority. The Court would have
had to address only the issue of whether Congress infringed on the role of the judiciary,
either by substituting its own interpretation for that of the Court's (a Marbury issue), or
by interfering with the judiciary's work (a Klein issue).
336. The Court discussed the extent of Congress's power, without ever explicitly
stating that when Congress exceeds it, Congress violates the separation of powers. For
example, the Court stated that "[tjhe design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of
the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States." Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. The
explicit emphasis here is on "restrictions on the States"; it is left to the reader to infer that
if Congress usurps interpretive power, it takes it from the judiciary.
337. See id. at 2162-68 (discussing the extent of Congress's § 5 power); see also
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 460-69 (describing RFRA's threat to federalism); Van
Alstyne, supra note 145, at 304-06 (same).
338. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166; see also id. at 2172 ("RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers .....
339. See id. at 2168-72.
340. See id. at 2163. For example, while discussing Congress's remedial power, the
Court noted that "[i]egislation ... can fall within Congress' enforcement power even if in
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into
'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). The focus here was not on the
significance of Congress's prohibiting constitutional conduct per se, but on the
ramifications of such actions on the states. The need to be cautious with the prophylactic
power arising from the Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments apparently results not from a threat to the judiciary, but from a threat to
state autonomy.
Similarly, when the Court described the distinction between remedial and substantive
power, it stated that "[tihe design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States." Id. at 2164 (emphasis added). The
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Moreover, the Court put its concerns regarding federalism
before its concerns regarding separation of powers. Thus, the Court's
analysis of the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
was devoted primarily to establishing that the purpose of the
Amendment was to give Congress merely a remedial power over the
states? 41 Only in the final paragraph did the Court note that "[t]he
design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in
maintaining the traditional separation of powers between Congress
and the Judiciary." 342
Perhaps the concern for federalism that the Court demonstrated
in Flores should not be surprising, given the heightened sensitivity
the Court recently has shown towards federalism principles in cases
concern does not appear to be with Congress's decreeing the substance of the
amendment; the Court leaves it to the reader to infer that this would intrude on the
Court's role. Instead, the Court's emphasis appears to be on Congress's action against the
states. After noting that the design and text imply that Congress may not decree the
substance of the Amendment's restrictions, the Court continued, "[w]ere it not so, what
Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the 'provisions
of [the Fourteenth Amendment].'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting § 5). This
does not mean that by purporting to determine the meaning of a constitutional provision,
Congress would usurp power from the Court; rather, if Congress were to attempt to
determine the meaning of the Constitution, its "enforcement" laws would be invalid as a
nullity, and Congress would be forcing this nullity upon the States. This would clearly
violate the principles of federalism. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text
(discussing federalism-based limits on the enforcement powers). The separation of
powers doctrine is implicitly affirmed here because the Supreme Court, and not Congress,
determines the meaning of the Constitution. See supra notes 264-70 and accompanying
text (discussing separation of powers limits on the enforcement powers). Any attempt on
the part of Congress to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment" would not
be a "meaningful" enforcement of that Amendment. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
Concerned for all the laws that could potentially fall under RFRA, and that would
have been allowed to stand under Smith II, the Court stated, "[t]his is a considerable
congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." Id. at 2171.
Finally, the Court observed that, were Congress able to affect its own powers by
altering the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, then "[s]hifting legislative majorities
could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed
amendment process contained in Article V." Id. at 2168. Again, the threat of allowing
RFRA to stand is not merely an usurpation of the Court's power, but an incursion on the
power of the States (and the People), by robbing them of their participation through the
formal amendment process. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (plurality
opinion) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that, but for
recent Supreme Court precedent, beginning with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the
provisions at issue would have required constitutional amendment); supra note 223 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of Rome, also making
this point).
341. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164-65.
342- 1& at 2166.
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involving the Commerce Clause 43 Indeed, in United States v.
Lopez,' 4 Justice Kennedy wrote that "uncertainty respecting the
existence, and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to
play a significant role in maintaining the design contemplated by the
Framers" is most evident in the area of federalism." He noted that
although the Court has had a difficult task, it has been able to
develop well-accepted standards regarding the separation of powers,
checks and balances, and judicial review.3 6  However, Justice
Kennedy pointed out that the Court's "role in preserving the federal
balance seems more tenuous."' He argued that the Court must
assume a role in preserving the federal balance: 48 "[T]he federal
balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and
plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to
intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the
scales too far." 49
As it did in the Commerce Clause350 area in Lopez, the Court
appears to have corrected an imbalance by tightening the standard of
review of Congress's use of its enforcement powers. In his essay
discussing the implications of Lopez, Julian Epstein noted the
conventional view that, prior to Lopez, the Court had been using a
"diminished rational basis review" for Congress's use of its
Commerce Clause power35 The test in Lopez, however, requires in
part that the regulated activity "substantially affects" commerce,
suggesting a "strengthened rational basis review. 3 52  Epstein
suggested that Lopez has "ratchet[ed] up the rational basis
343. See Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other
Cases, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 525, 546-49 (1997) (examining the implications of Lopez
with respect to additional limits on congressional power that the judiciary may impose in
other areas); Frickey, supra note 270, at 728-30 (examining the Court's increasing
emphasis on congressional fact-finding in judicial review as a means of curbing Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, and speculating about the spread to other
congressional action); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause).
344. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
345. Id at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
346. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
347. ML (Kennedy, J., concurring).
348. See id. at 575-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
349. Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2172 (discussing
the Court's role in preserving the federal balance); Lessig, supra note 18, at 130
(observing that Lopez "finds implied in the constitutional structure limits on the federal
government's power,... which today can be supported only by affirmative limits
constructed by the Court").
350. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
351. See Epstein, supra note 343, at 535.
352 Id. at 535-36.
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scrutiny.""3 3  Other academic commentators have agreed with
Epstein's assessment of the strengthening of the test.35 4
In a parallel manner, what was once a weak rational basis
standard in the case of Congress's enforcement power has now been
"ratcheted up" in Flores to a proportionality test.35 5 The VRA cases
had relied on what was essentially a rational basis test, based on the
test articulated in M'Culloch v. Maryland."6 In later cases, the Court
confirmed that it accorded Congress a high degree of deference when
Congress acted pursuant to its enforcement powers. For example,
referring to the Morgan decision, the Court described its role in
reviewing congressional action pursuant to § 5 by saying that "[it was
enough that the Court could perceive a basis upon which Congress
could reasonably predicate [its] judgment. '357  In a later case, the
Court in dicta described its review of an exercise of Congress's § 5
power as requiring only that the Court be able to "discern some
legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of
that power. '358 And, in still a later case, Justice O'Connor, joined by
two other Justices, wrote that "Congress ... has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the
353. Id. at 536.
354. See Frickey, supra note 270, at 728 ("The rationality review used ... is far more
stringent than the usual, 'anything goes' variety."); Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of
United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV 1, 2 (1995)
(asserting that Lopez attempts to create special protection for state sovereignty by
heightening the scrutiny of federal legislation regulating areas of traditional concern to
the states); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 674, 684 (1995)
(characterizing the new Commerce Clause standard of Lopez as "rational basis with
'bite'" (citing Gerald Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-48
(1972))); see also United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1459 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I read Lopez as requiring courts to use more
than mere rational basis scrutiny in reviewing challenges to Congress's commerce
powers.").
355. The Court had earlier applied a very deferential standard of review to
congressional action pursuant to its enforcement power. See Burt, supra note 94, at 114
(calling the standard of review used in Morgan "simply a test of rationality, with
implications of even greater deference to Congress than that ordinarily deferential
standard would itself suggest"). Yet, in Flores, the Court was not deferential to Congress,
insisting on a showing that the means Congress employed were proportional to legitimate
ends. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170-71.
356. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (articulating the standard of review for
congressional action pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause); see supra notes 180-
238 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of the M'Culloch test in
the VRA cases).
357. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477 (1980) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
358. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 n.18 (1983).
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power to define situations which Congress determines threaten
principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with
those situations. 359
RFRA's proponents relied on such language when proclaiming
that RFRA would not be found unconstitutional.360 But Justice
Kennedy interpreted the VRA precedents in a different way. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court had to justify Congress's
ban on literacy tests in the face of an earlier Supreme Court decision
that such tests are not per se unconstitutional. 6' The Court defended
this provision of the VRA by saying that "the Court has recognized
that exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not
otherwise appropriate. '362 In the context of the decision and its place
in history, this statement is easily viewed as providing justification for
allowing Congress to ban conduct that is not on its face
unconstitutional in advance of adjudication, rather than as placing a
limit on such power. 63 Defending the unprecedented nature of the
remedies of the VRA more generally, the Court stated that "[t]he
constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be
judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects."364
Again, a natural interpretation, given the context, is that this
statement was meant to justify the use of such power by Congress,
not to limit that power. Yet, the Flores Court cited such statements
in support of its conclusion that when Congress acts pursuant to its
enforcement power, there must be a congruence between the
legislative ends and the means for achieving those ends.365 Thus, the
359. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989). Justice O'Connor
was joined in this part of her opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. See
id. at 476. Arguably, Justice O'Connor suggested here that Congress has some
substantive power.
360. See Laycock, supra note 97, at 152-67; Robin-Vergeer, supra note 79, at 741; see
also Pawa, supra note 188, at 1097 (asserting that "RFRA would pass the Morgan test").
361. See supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text (discussing South Carolina v.
Katzenbach).
362. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,334 (1966).
363. This was Congress's first use of the prophylactic power pursuant to § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. To uphold the VRA against a challenge that it violated
federalism and the separation of powers, the Court had to justify the existence of such a
power used to enact such "unprecedented remedies." Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167. It seems
unlikely that the Court would attempt to limit that power at the same time. See supra
notes 180-97 and accompanying test (discussing South Carolina v. Katzenbach).
364. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308 (quoted in Flores, 117 S. Ct. at
2166).
365. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166-67, 2169. The Court did not subject the challenged
provisions of the VRA to a balancing test. It simply noted that there was a rational
connection between the ends Congress sought to address and the means Congress
employed.
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Flores Court found in the expansive language of the VRA cases
support for limiting Congress's enforcement power by subjecting
congressional action pursuant to the Enforcement Clause to a stricter
standard of review than had been applied in the VRA cases.
The interpretation the Flores Court gave to the language of the
VRA cases is not inconsistent with those holdings: In the face of
egregious precedents, Congress has the authority to legislate with the
prophylactic power. But the Flores Court has set new limits on
Congress's enforcement power. To say that certain circumstances
justify the action of Congress is not equivalent to the statement that,
in the absence of such circumstances, congressional action is not
justified.366 Although it has not contradicted or overturned earlier
precedent, 67 the Court has effected a change in its Enforcement
Clause jurisprudence.3"
The Court could have based its decision to strike RFRA solely
on the separation of powers doctrine.3 69 The Court chose instead to
analyze Congress's enforcement power, which necessarily involved a
consideration of both federalism and separation of powers.3 70
Writing the decision as it did, the Court used Flores to affect the
power balance between the Court and Congress and between the
federal government and the states.
Regarding the balance between the Court and Congress, it is
now clear that with respect to the Civil War Amendments, the Court,
not Congress, interprets the substantive provisions of the
Constitution. Moreover, the Court has taken on responsibility for
enforcing federalism-based limits on Congress's enforcement powers.
366. It is reasonable to conclude that Flores presented the Court, for the first time,
with facts that required it to look at the distinction between Congress's use of its remedial
power and the use of an unauthorized power, in the form of substantive legislation. While
Congress's enforcement power has always been limited, see id. at 2163, only now must the
Court articulate those limits.
367. The Court clearly approved of its VRA precedents, and indicated that those cases
would pass the Flores proportionality test. Thus, the Court could be replacing its prior
M'Culloch standard with a new standard, without disturbing its precedents. The standard
has been rearticulated based on a new set of facts. On the other hand, perhaps the
weaker rationality standard of M'Culloch is still valid, in the sense that, given the proper
circumstances, the Court will still defer to Congress.
368. Under the permissive standard employed by the Court in the VRA cases, RFRA
arguably could have survived. Congress had a legitimate end in mind: the protection of
First Amendment rights. Moreover, there is a rational connection between this end and
the means Congress adopted in the form of RFRA, which is all that the Court had
required in the VRA cases. See Laycock, supra note 97, at 167; Pawa, supra note 188, at
1097.
369. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
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Regarding the balance between Congress and the states, the Court
has shifted some power back to the states, at the expense of
Congress, by renouncing any substantive power Congress might have
had, and by strengthening the standard of review of Congress's
enforcement power.
KATHERiNE A. MURPHY
